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 The past several decades have seen cities,1 reinvigorated by increased growth and political 
will, emerging as progressive forces in a number of areas.  The urban portfolio often includes 
measures focused on environmental protection, and environmental advocates and scholars have 
been vocal in their support for this new wave of local environmentalism.  This trend has been 
countered by a rising division between state and local populations on social issues. In a number of 
states, however, local legislation addressing issues such as sexual orientation and gender, minimum 
wage, and environmental protection has provoked state legislators to pass statutes that explicitly 
remove certain policy options from local authority.  These state measures invalidate local laws 
passed, in most cases, pursuant to the localities’ home rule authority.   
 At first glance, the framework for distribution of state and local power in the United States 
presents no barrier to this kind of state action.  Localities have historically operated under the 
umbrella of the state, and are vested with only those powers specifically delegated to them.  To 
loosen the strictures of this approach, throughout the twentieth century most states adopted home 
rule provisions.  These provisions, although highly varied, were in general designed to allow localities 
to solve urban issues creatively, and avoid state determination of local matters.  The home rule 
doctrine therefore allocates to localities a certain degree of authority.  In all home rule states, 
however, that power is generally subject to override by the state upon assertion of a state interest, or 
the passage of general state legislation that conflicts with the local measure.   
While the ability of the state to counteract local laws is very strong, assertions of state power 
have at times received pushback from courts.  This is particularly the case when certain categories of 
local legislation, or impacts on constitutional rights, are at issue.  Such checks on state power 
                                                          
1 This Article uses “cities,” “localities,” and “local government,” interchangeably, and encompasses local governments of 
various sizes and population characteristics.  See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part Two—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 
Colum. L. Rev. 346, 346-49 (1990) (discussing the ways in which the term “city” can be used and construed in academic 
literature).  While most of the examples of the kinds of local action discussed come from major metropolitan areas, the 
analysis applies equally to all subdivisions of the state. 
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constrain legislative allocations of burdens and benefits, and make clear that there are boundaries to 
state ability to take back authority from localities.  These frameworks do not apply well, however, to 
state measures that bar certain kinds of local environmental action.  The lack of fit between these 
approaches and environmental laws leaves local control over environmental issues unprotected from 
even the most basic checks on state authority.  As a result, the sphere of local autonomy carved out 
by home rule is particularly easy to undermine in the environmental context.     
There has a growing conversation about the potential for local action on environmental 
issues.2  There has also been much discussion of preemption as it relates to local lawmaking,3 and of 
the limitations on city authority in the face of state action.4  These two camps have not yet been fully 
reconciled, however; advocates for local action often fail to acknowledge the real limits on local 
power under the home rule framework, while local government scholars tend to accept those limits 
as inevitable.  Because defining the proper sphere of local authority goes to the very heart of the 
home rule doctrine, the inapplicability of these protections to a specific kind of law warrants 
attention to a judicial or legislative fix.  This Article attempts to bridge the gap between these 
positions by acknowledging the constraints of home rule while envisioning a way forward for local 
environmental laws.   
                                                          
2 See generally, e.g., GREENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT: LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING SUSTAINABILITY, 
EFFICIENCY, AND FISCAL SAVINGS, Keith H. Hirokawa & Patricia E. Salkin, eds., ABA Press, Section of State and Local 
Government Law (2012); see also, e.g., John R. Nolon, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH LAND USE LAW: 
STANDING GROUND 261-95 (ELI Press 2014); Brian Stone, Jr., THE CITY AND THE COMING CLIMATE: CLIMATE 
CHANGE IN THE PLACES WE LIVE 97-126, Cambridge University Press (2012). 
3 To the extent that state authority over categories of local environmental laws has been discussed to date, it has 
generally occurred in the context of natural gas drilling, often through the lens of implied preemption.  Because of the 
unique state role in oil and gas production, fracking regulations at the local level may require a different kind of inquiry.  
For that reason, this scholarship and case law, while contributing to a background understanding of state rejection of 
local measures, are unlikely to be directly relevant.  Similarly, this Article does not discuss issues of implied preemption.  
At the core of this discussion is intentional, express preemption of local laws by state legislatures, and the extent to 
which home rule does or could offer some checks on that kind of preemption. 
4 Shannon M. Roesler, Federalism and Local Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1111 (2015) (exploring the 
potential for federal authority to be exercised in support of local laws); Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-
Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 959, 987-89 (2007). 
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A potential solution may be available in the form of protections for the environment that 
exist in some state constitutions and the public trust doctrine.  Where state constitutions protect a 
degree of environmental quality, that constitutional value may not be undermined by state action.  
And even where that right is not manifested in a specific constitutional guarantee, background 
public trust principles may establish the state and its localities as custodians of the environment for 
their citizens.  Such principles could in turn inspire and enable judges to push back on reactive 
targeting of local measures by the state where the result is a net loss of environmental protection.  
This kind of judicial skepticism of state action, while open-ended in nature, is not unprecedented; a 
similar defense of local experimentation in support of citizens’ rights has been seen in decisions by 
the Supreme Court and others in response to a variety of restrictive state actions that intrude on 
principles of local control or infringe on constitutional rights.  This Article suggests ways in which 
judges could similarly apply environmental protections and principles in evaluating state action.   
Certainly, there are many debates to be had about the merits of home rule and the 
decisionmaker best-suited to make policy for various topics.  The trouble with many arguments that 
advocate for one level of government over another is that they have a tendency to take potentially 
short-sighted positions for the sake of an ideological victory.  Fifteen years ago, many environmental 
advocates railed against local control as responsible for suburban sprawl and attendant 
environmental damage, and urged state or regional control of land use issues.  Substantive principles 
located in state constitutional provisions and the public trust doctrine may, however, be able to offer 
an environmental lodestar for state and local governments alike.   
Today, given the political realities of the country, and that innovative environmental 
protections may currently be more likely to occur at the local level than any other, preservation of 
the possibility for environmental action within this realm of authority is important.  Whether states’ 
preemption authority includes an ability to dismantle local environmental and other policies through 
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targeted prohibitions will have potentially far-reaching consequences.  If cities are to continue their 
important work as leaders with regard to climate change adaptation and mitigation, transportation 
initiatives, pollution reduction, and many other issues, the prospect of states outlawing local policy 
responses one at a time is concerning.  Modifying the lens through which state revocation of 
authority over certain categories of environmental policy is viewed will advance the interests of cities 
in making environmental progress at the local level. 
* * * * * 
 Part I of the Article addresses recent trends toward local environmental policymaking.  Part 
II discusses the contours of home rule authority and the power dynamic between state and local 
governments.  Part III provides examples of how state preemption of local environmental action 
might be effected under this framework, looking in particular at statewide bans on local plastic bag 
bans.  Part IV offers a description of some exceptions to the typical home rule framework, and 
discusses why those exceptions tend not to apply to the environmental context.  This discussion 
suggests, however, that courts may be able to rely on other means, including underlying principles of 
state constitutional or common law, to provide for greater protection of local governments in the 
face of reactive, piecemeal state legislation targeting local environmental measures.    
I. Cities and Progressive Politics 
The past several decades in the United States have seen a revitalization of the urban core in 
many cities around the country.5  These changes have resulted in shifts in the political and cultural 
sphere.6  Following the suburban boom of the 1950s and 1960s, and the ensuing urban fiscal and 
law enforcement problems of the 1970s and 1980s,7 a number of cities have seen a resurgence in 
                                                          
5 See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, The Rebirth of the Neighborhood, 40 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1595 (2013). 
6 Cf. Parag Khanna, “A New Map for America,” The New York Times, Sunday Review, Opinion (April 15, 2016) 
(positing that “America is . . . headed toward a metropolis-first arrangement”). 
7 For a general description of these issues, see, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Detroit and the Decline of Urban America, 2013 Mich St. 
L. Rev. 1547 (2013). 
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activity and population, complete with newly desirable real estate, investment, and employment 
opportunities.  Along with this growth has come increased local political will, from populations that 
are often more progressive than their less urban counterparts,8 and both the need and desire for 
local governments to engage in extensive policymaking.  Invested with the funding and political 
capital needed to advance major initiatives, local authorities are acting on a number of issues. This 
kind of urban experimentation by localities is important; local lawmaking can act as a “catalyst for 
change,”9 is well-suited to address a range of problems because of its flexible nature,10 and can 
overcome barriers to progress faced at the state or national level.11  The sheer number of local 
governments makes them an important force; “if the fifty states are laboratories for public policy 
formation, then surely the 3,000 counties and 15,000 municipalities provide logarithmically more 
opportunities for innovation, experimentation, and reform.”12 
Environmental issues are one area in which the trend toward local policymaking has been 
taking hold.  “[C]ities have been at the forefront of environmental activism for a long time,”13 and 
have long innovated with regard to local solutions to environmental problems.14  And with the 
recent rise in city populations and increased political activism, local governments are now leading 
with respect to policymaking in the environmental realm on issues such as transit and development 
                                                          
8 See, e.g., Josh Kron, “Red State, Blue City: How the Urban-Rural Divide Is Splitting America,” The Atlantic (Nov. 30, 
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/red-state-blue-city-how-the-urban-rural-divide-is-
splitting-america/265686/ (noting that “virtually every major city (100,000-plus population) in the United States of 
America has a different outlook from the less populous areas that are closest to it”). 
9 Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1113 (2007). 
10 John R. Nolon, In Praise of Pariochialism: the Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 399 (2002). 
11 See Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Formation and the Relocalization of Environmental Law, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 87, 107-08 
(2012). 
12 Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 Urb. Law. 253, 259 (2004).  This view of local 
innovation is, however, not uncontested.  See generally, e.g., Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy 
Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 Emory L.J. 1333 (2009) (concluding, after empirical study, that local government 
may produce a lower than optimal level of innovation).  
13 Dorceta E. Taylor, THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE PEOPLE IN AMERICAN CITIES, 1600S-1900S: DISORDER, 
INEQUALITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 502, Duke University Press: Durham (2009) (describing efforts by cities over several 
centuries focused on issues such as clean water, clean air, waste disposal, preservation of open space, and others). 
14 Ian Douglas, CITIES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 309, I.B. Tauris (2013). 
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strategies, climate mitigation and adaptation, toxics reform, and other subjects.15  As cities grow, 
ecological challenges become intertwined with urban problems, and the development of more 
sustainable cities is essential.16   
The call for local power over environmental issues is not necessarily an intuitive one.  Local 
decisionmaking over environmental issues has often been decried as unsound policy, given cities’ at-
times parochial conduct in thwarting efforts to solve environmental problems, such as sprawl 
development.17  Externalities inherent in many environmental problems have led many to advocate 
for centralized decisionmaking—to nationalize, or even internationalize, environmental policy.18  
Greater resources and expertise at higher levels of government may also make environmental 
lawmaking more successful.19  There exist, however, environmental issues of uniquely local impact 
and importance.20  Moreover, given the current political climate, localities may be the only realistic 
                                                          
15 See, e.g., Shannon M. Roesler, Federalism and Local Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1111, 1113 (2015); see 
also Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Formation and the Relocalization of Environmental Law, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 87, 89 (2012) 
(“Local food, local work, local energy production—all are hallmarks of a resurgence of localism throughout 
contemporary environmental thought and action”); John Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: the Advent of Local Environmental 
Law, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 365, 365 (2002) (noting a “remarkable and unnoticed trend among local governments to 
adopt laws that protect natural resources”). 
16 See, e.g., Introduction (2010). [Online]. In N Cohen (ed.). Green cities: An A-to-Z guide. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. Available from: 
https://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/greencities/introduct
ion/0 [Accessed 14 June 2016]; see also Jeanette Sadik-Khan & Seth Solomon, Street Fight: Handbook for an Urban 
Revolution 24, Viking Press: New York (2016) (noting that the national urban population is expected to grow by 100 
million people by 2050, and that “[a]dding a population nearly the equivalent of the nation’s four largest states to cities 
and their suburbs could easily exhaust their [ability to provide services to their populations] . . . [t]o attract, retain, and 
accommodate rising populations, our leaders must rapidly implement strategies that make cities more attractive places to 
live while making their infrastructure function more efficiently to meet the growing demand.”) 
17 See Jim Rossi, ‘Maladaptive’ Federalism: the Structural Barriers to Coordination of State Sustainability Initiatives, 64 Case Western 
Res. L. Rev. 1759, 1761 (2014) (noting that local innovation and control can be suboptimal where it fails to account for 
coordination benefits); David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, (2003); David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of 
Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 487, 488-89 (1999).  Recent developments in urban dynamics make these 
predictions less likely, however, and inform the position that on balance, vesting some power in local governments to 
make environmentally protective laws is warranted. 
18 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, 
1962 (2007) (arguing that subnational action on climate change is ineffective at best, and harmful at worst). 
19 See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, “Local climate change law, at 15, in LOCAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CITIES AND OTHER LOCALITIES, Benjamin J. Richardson, ed., Edward Elgar (2012). 
20 Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 237, 244 
(2000) (noting that “[t]he decentralization of authority over environmental issues “may be an appropriate response to the 
fact that environmental problems often tend to be place-specific”). 
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option for pursuing environmental solutions,21 and “local, multi-stakeholder involvement in 
environmental decision making [may be] key to effecting better environmental results.”22  Motivated 
by these trends, environmental law scholars and policymakers alike have started to explore “the 
positive potential of local governance in addressing a range of contemporary environmental 
problems.”23   
These urban environmental measures have taken a variety of forms, address a variety of 
topics, and occur in cities both large and small.  For example, trash collection and recycling have 
long been the purview of local governments.24  As urban populations increase, and available land for 
trash disposal becomes scarce, the need to reduce trash flow and improve recycling efforts is clear 
for cities across the country.25  In response, a number of localities have developed waste reduction 
or recycling programs as part of their sustainability portfolios.26  Some of these efforts have taken 
                                                          
21 See Jim Rossi, ‘Maladaptive’ Federalism: the Structural Barriers to Coordination of State Sustainability Initiatives, 64 Case Western 
Res. L. Rev. 1759, 1761 (2014) (theorizing that trend toward local environmental governance is best explained by 
“simple pragmatism,” given the relative ease of passing laws at the local level than at the state or federal levels). 
22 William A. Shutkin, THE LAND THAT COULD BE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 109, MIT Press (2000). 
23 Shannon M. Roesler, Federalism and Local Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1111, 1113 (2015). 
24 See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344 (2007) (“[w]aste disposal 
is both typically and traditionally a local government function.”); see also, e.g., 7 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 24:246 (3d ed.) 
(“Municipal corporations ordinarily may cause, regulate, or directly perform the collection and disposal of garbage and 
refuse within their areas”); Ian Douglas, CITIES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 163-181, I.B. Tauris (2013) (describing 
history of local measures regarding waste disposal and recycling, from 1900s to present). 
25 See, e.g., Megan Backsen, Jack Hornickel, Cradle-to-Cradle: The Elimination of Waste Introduction, 16 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 572 
(2015) (“Academics and governments alike continue to view the steady accumulation of garbage as a threat to orderly 
life.”); Joan Mullany, POPPING THE PLASTICS QUESTION: PLASTICS RECYCLING AND BANS ON PLASTICS—CONTACTS, 
RESOURCES AND LEGISLATION 2, Issue Brief, National League of Cities (1990) (noting that “[t]he management and 
disposal of municipal solid waste has become one of the foremost issues facing local elected officials over the past 
decade and unfortunately, promises to continue to demand their attention through the end of this century”). 
26 See, e.g., City of Cleveland, “Zero Waste,” 
http://www.city.cleveland.oh.us/CityofCleveland/Home/Government/CityAgencies/OfficeOfSustainability/WasteRe
ductionAndRecycling (“The City saves money and natural resources by decreasing the waste generated through its own 
operations and within the larger city limits. This includes both residential and commercial waste reduction and recycling 
programs. The City diverts thousands of tons of waste from the landfill each year, saving over $1 million annually 
through waste disposal cost avoidance and recycling revenue”); Sustainable Santa Fe Plan 25-27 (Oct. 29, 2008), available 
at http://www.santafenm.gov/media/files/Public_Utilities_Environmental_Services/SustainableSFweb.pdf (describing 
waste reduction and recycling efforts by Santa Fe); Anna Clark, “Creative Ways Cities Are Pushing Recycling,” NextCity 
(Sept. 2, 2014) (describing recycling initiatives in Houston and Detroit). 
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the form of bans or fees on plastic bags, Styrofoam, and other forms of disposable packaging.27  
Such local initiatives may help to reduce, at least in part, the toll on municipal garbage and recycling 
processes, and the environment, that plastic bags exact.28  They may also serve as a gateway into 
broader environmental engagement for communities.29  To achieve these goals, cities will likely need 
to employ command and control measures, such as bans, or market incentives, such as surcharges 
on bag use. 
Cities are also on the front lines of climate change.  Cities may be “both a cause and a 
solution to global warming.”30  That is, cities account for a greatly disproportionate percentage of 
greenhouse gas emissions, and as city populations increase, emissions will follow.31  But cities may 
also be able to employ a variety of strategies that can help to reduce emissions, and to address issues 
of sea level rise, energy efficiency, urban resiliency, water use, and others.  A number of cities have 
realized the long-term planning that will be required in order to prepare for these changes,32 and 
have begun to develop policies accordingly.33  For example, many local governments are involved in 
siting of renewable energy projects, offering financial incentives to encourage development of 
                                                          
27 See also, e.g., Stephen Maxwell Reck, The Expanding Environmental Consciousness of Local Government: Municipalities That Have 
Banned Styrofoam and the Legal Consequences, 11 U. Bridgeport L. Rev. 127 (1990) (listing cities with bans on styrofoam 
packaging). 
28 See Adam Sternbergh, “The Fight Over Plastic Bags is About a Lot More Than How to Get Groceries Home,” New 
York Magazine (July 15, 2015), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/07/plastic-bag-bans.html 
29 See Carolyn Flower, “Banning the Bag, Greening the City,” NextCity (July 12, 2012), 
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/banning-the-bag-greening-the-city (last visited July 15, 2016). 
30 Green Cities: Mayoral Initiatives to Reduce Global Warming Pollution, p. 1, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Energy 
Independent and Global Warming, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session (June 19, 
2007); see also Patricia E. Salkin, Can You Hear Me Up There? Giving Voice to Local Communities Imperative for Achieving 
Sustainability, 4 Envt’l & Energy L. & Pol’y J. 256, 258 (2009) (“voices and actions of local governments are critical to 
achieving truly sustainable communities, especially in the climate change arena”). 
31 Green Cities: Mayoral Initiatives to Reduce Global Warming Pollution, p. 1, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Energy 
Independent and Global Warming, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session (June 19, 
2007). 
32 See, e.g., Brian Stone, Jr., THE CITY AND THE COMING CLIMATE: CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE PLACES WE LIVE 96, 
Cambridge University Press (2012) (noting the need for cities to “fundamentally remake themselves to become viable 
enterprises” in advance of further shifts in climate). 
33 See, e.g., Edward Hart, “8 Creative Ways Cities are Combating Rising Temperatures,” NEW YORK MAGAZINE, The 
Urbanist (June 15, 2016), available at http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/06/how-cities-are-combating-rising-
temperatures.html 
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renewable energy sources, promoting interconnection to the grid to allow consumers to profit from 
generation of their own renewable energy, and establishing local renewable portfolio standards that 
require a certain percentage of city power to be purchased from renewable sources.34  Security of the 
land mass for a city is also critical, and cities have engaged in development of adaptation strategies to 
handle phenomena like sea level rise.35  In 2007, New York City developed the first draft of its 
PlaNYC portfolio of sustainability measures.  That plan is designed to make the city more resilient in 
the face of climate change and rising sea levels by strengthening coastline defenses, creating building 
standards that will better protect the built environment against severe weather, and improving urban 
infrastructure.36  PlaNYC was updated after the damage wrought on the city in 2012 by Hurricane 
Sandy made even more apparent the potential dangers for the city of extreme weather and rising sea 
levels.37  Localities across the country are developing their own adaptation plans and policies to 
address the coming changes.38  These plans are likely to require authority on the part of localities 
over a wide array of property, utilities, and many other aspects of local governance. 
Finally, transit policy has long shaped cities, for better and for worse.  The massive highway 
projects of the mid-twentieth century had lasting impacts on cities by bifurcating neighborhoods and 
providing a quick conduit in and out of urban areas.  In many cities, mass transit was long ago 
abandoned in favor of the car, and parking lots cover a high percentage of valuable urban land.  As 
more people move back into cities, and cities become increasingly interested in more efficient use of 
                                                          
34 See, e.g., Jessica Reinhardt, “Greening the Grid,” in GREENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT: LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR 
PROMOTING SUSTAINABILITY, EFFICIENCY, AND FISCAL SAVINGS 193-209, Keith H. Hirokawa & Patricia E. Salkin, 
eds., ABA Press, Section of State and Local Government Law (2012). 
35 See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, “Local climate change law, at 7, in LOCAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CITIES AND OTHER LOCALITIES, Benjamin J. Richardson, ed., Edward Elgar (2012) 
(“Climate adaptation is innately suited to response at a local level.”).  
36 See, e.g., New York City Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/resiliency/resiliency.shtml.  
37 See generally PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York, The City of New York, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg 
(2013), available at http://s-media.nyc.gov/agencies/sirr/SIRR_singles_Lo_res.pdf 
38 See generally Georgetown Climate Center, “State and Local Adaptation Plans,” 
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/plans.html (providing comprehensive set of links to local climate 
adaptation plans around the country). 
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land as well as improvements in air quality, transit policies have received additional attention from 
local governments.39  A renewed focus on transit can have profound benefits for urban life,40 as well 
as for the environment.  The interest of cities in tackling the transportation needs of their citizens 
for the coming years can be seen, for instance, in the competition for the United States Department 
of Transportation’s Smart Cities Challenge, a $40 million grant to integrate new technology, such as 
self-driving cars, into urban transportation infrastructure.  And across the country, cities of various 
sizes and demographics, such as Kansas City,41 Los Angeles,42 Columbus,43 Providence,44 and many 
others, are using new transit policies to convert urban areas shaped by decades of focus on suburbs, 
highways, and the personal automobile into those that can better serve their newly invigorated urban 
cores.  To do that, however, they must have some control over property for use in transit, the ability 
to raise needed funds, and the freedom to adjust street and traffic codes,45 among other powers.   
These are merely a handful of examples of local environmental problems and solutions that 
occur outside the broader network of state and federal environmental regulations.  They are critical 
to the health of cities, and to the ability of urban areas to adjust to shifting demands.  Given the 
important role that cities are likely to play in any blueprint for a sustainable future, ensuring that 
local leaders are able to make needed changes is essential.  Further, as mentioned, cities are, in some 
                                                          
39 David S. Silverman & Brent O. Denzin, “Green Transportation: Roadblocks and Avenues for Promoting Low-Impact 
Transportation Choices,” GREENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT: LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING SUSTAINABILITY, 
EFFICIENCY, AND FISCAL SAVINGS 159, Keith H. Hirokawa & Patricia E. Salkin, eds., American Bar Association (2012). 
40 Vukan R. Vuchic, TRANSPORTATION FOR LIVABLE CITIES 7, Center for Urban Policy Research: Rutgers , the State 
University of New Jersey (1999) (“A number of elements comprising livability of an area depend, directly or indirectly, 
on the type and quality of its transportation system.”) 
41 “Kansas City Announces Opening Date of KC Streetcar,” City of Kansas City, Missouri, http://kcmo.gov/streetcar/ 
42 See, e.g., Janette Sadik-Khan & Seth Solomon, Street Fight: Handbook for an Urban Revolution 68-69, New York: 
Viking (2016). 
43 “U.S. Department of Transportation Announces Columbus as Winner of Unprecedented $40 Million Smart City 
Challenge,” U.S. Department of Transportation (June 23, 2016) (describing plans to use transportation technology to 
link parts of the city). 
44 “Enhanced Transit Corridor in Downtown Providence,” Office of Mayor Jorge O. Elorza, Providence, Rhode Island 
(March 14, 2016), https://www.providenceri.com/mayor/enhanced-transit-corridor-in-downtown-providence 
45 See, e.g., Janette Sadik-Khan & Seth Solomon, Street Fight: Handbook for an Urban Revolution 30-31, New York: 
Viking (2016) (describing adoption of new urban street design guides). 
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parts of the country, the only level of government at which innovations in environmental protection 
are occurring at the moment.  This is not to say that city power will always be directed toward the 
good of the ecosystem.  But it does mean that clarifying the ways in which substantive law may offer 
a means of upholding local power against state intrusions is critical in terms of laying out a plan for 
environmental protection. 
II. State and Local Relationship 
The rise in urban power has been accompanied by a growing number of substantive policy 
conflicts between states and localities.  Generally speaking, local governments operate under powers 
delegated to them by state governments.  The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
says that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”46  The lack of mention of local 
governments in the Constitution has generally been interpreted to mean that localities’ sole authority 
derives from the states.  As described in greater detail below, the shape of power conferred upon 
local governments has changed over the nation’s history.  Today, localities in most states have some 
independent sphere of authority within which they can act without express permission from or 
action by the state.  While operating under those delegated powers, however,47 localities “sometimes 
seek to pass laws and regulations that go beyond what their respective state governments desire.”48  
In many instances and in many different fields, this has resulted in state governments acting to 
remove specific policy outcomes or subject areas from local control via preemption, or in the 
explicit removal of certain aspects of home rule authority from local governments.  Understanding 
                                                          
46 U.S. CONST., ART. X. 
47 John Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: the Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 365, 365 (2002). 
48 Shannon M. Roesler, Federalism and Local Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1111, 1115 (2015). 
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this dynamic is important for an appreciation of the functional power that cities have to effect 
change at the local level.49 
A. The Evolution of Home Rule  
There is a long history of local self-governance in the United States,50 though that has never 
meant local independence.  While a thorough recounting of state and local relations in the United 
States has been discussed in detail elsewhere51 and is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief 
description of the relationship will provide some context for the ensuing discussion.  Local 
independence from the monarchy was a fiercely-asserted right in seventeenth-century England.52  
And in colonial America, local governance was the first kind of recognized authority.53  The political 
status of early American cities, however, was not entirely settled.  In post-revolutionary America, the 
question of how best to think about the authority of local governments occupied courts for much of 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and has continued to be the subject of much debate.54 
While the American political structure has always varied from that of England, American 
courts seem to have imported the British tradition of thinking of cities as “corporate entit[ies] 
intermediate between the state and the individual.”55  As a result, “the legal system in America 
formulated the rights of cities in the process of establishing the general relationship between 
                                                          
49 See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: the Politics of City Status in American 
Law, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 83, 152 (1986). 
50 See, e.g., John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of State-Interests in Land Use Control, 10 Pace Envtl. 
L. Rev. 497, 506 (1993). 
51 See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 26-53, Princeton 
University Press: Princeton (1999) (providing detailed discussion of the legal history of cities). 
52 Gerald E. Frug, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 34-35, Princeton University 
Press: Princeton (1999). 
53 Dale Krane, et al., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 8, Congressional Quarterly Press: 
Washington, DC (2001). 
54 Joseph F. Zimmerman, STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS: A PARTNERSHIP APPROACH 17, Westport: Praeger (1995) (“The 
most desirable degree to which political power should be decentralized by a state government to local governments has 
been a source of major controversy since the end of the Revolutionary War.”) 
55 Gerald E. Frug, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 26, Princeton University Press: 
Princeton (1999). 
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corporations and the state.”56  Until the early nineteenth century, American courts tended to treat 
cities and private corporations in the same way, and these entities often had similar powers.57  Then, 
in 1819, the United States Supreme Court issued its seminal decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward.58  Trustees of Dartmouth College created a formal distinction between private and public 
corporations.  The former, as the province of private citizens, had property rights that had to be 
protected against state intrusion; the latter, founded by the government, required no such 
protection.59  Following that decision, a leading early treatise developed a theory that “public 
corporations . . . are invested with subordinate legislative powers . . . and such powers are subject to 
the control of the legislature of the state.”60  The characterization of cities as public corporations 
subordinate to the state became widespread, retaining protections against state intrusion only for 
private property.61  This shift, which ran contrary to much of the history of state and local relations, 
“turned the political world as it then existed upside down.”62   
For some time, this theory of local subordination to state control went untested.  An 
increase in city functions during the mid-nineteenth century, however, prompted new debates over 
the proper relationship of city to state.  One theory of how best to allocate power between the two 
entities was advanced by Judge Thomas M. Cooley, who authored an 1868 treatise in which he 
stated that “the sovereign people had delegated only part of their sovereignty to the states,” and had 
“preserved the remainder for themselves in written and unwritten constitutional limitations on 
                                                          
56 Id. at 27. 
57 Id. at 40. 
58 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
59 See Gerald E. Frug, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 41, Princeton University 
Press: Princeton (1999). 
60 Dale Krane, et al., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 8-9, Congressional Quarterly Press: 
Washington, DC (2001) (citing James Kent, Commentaries on American Law (1836)). 
61 Gerald E. Frug, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 42, Princeton University Press: 
Princeton (1999). 
62 Id. at 43. 
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governmental actions.”63  One of those important limitations was “the people’s right to local self-
government.”64  A formulation directly contrary to Cooley’s position, however, soon appeared in an 
1872 treatise by Judge John F. Dillon.  In his treatise, Dillon argued that democratic goals of 
governance and avoidance of special interests were best accomplished through state legislative 
control of cities.65  He stated this view in broad terms by noting that state power “is supreme and 
transcendent: it may erect, change, divide, and even abolish, at pleasure, as it deems the public good 
to require,” and that courts have a duty to require local governments to “show a plain and clear 
grant for the authority they assume to exercise . . . .”66  Dillon’s views appear to have been based on 
an “expectation that state and judicial control would help ensure the attainment by cities of an 
unselfish public good,”67 as well as on his own ties to corporate actors interested in state control.68  
“Dillon’s Rule” was eventually adopted nationwide, possibly influenced by negative views of cities 
that painted them as “the home of mobs, foreigners, racial minorities, and sinners,”69 a threat to 
national unity,70 and “islands of private parochialism.”71  Its broad acceptance meant that localities 
could operate pursuant only to specific grants of power from the state legislature.  The Rule did not 
dictate how much power should be delegated to localities, but it vested the source of that power 
squarely with the state.72  
                                                          
63 Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: the Politics of City Status in American Law, 
1986 Wis. L. Rev. 83, 88 (1986). 
64 Id. 
65 Gerald E. Frug, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 46-47, Princeton University 
Press: Princeton (1999). 
66 Id. at 47. 
67 Id. 
68 Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: the Politics of City Status in American Law, 
1986 Wis. L. Rev. 83, 91-99, 148-49 (1986). 
69 Id. at 9. 
70 Gerald E. Frug, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 43-44, Princeton University 
Press: Princeton (1999). 
71 David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 487 (1999). 
72 See Dale Krane, et al., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 10, Congressional Quarterly Press: 
Washington, DC (2001). 
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Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, localities were heavily dependent on the states.  
Local governments could take no action on any issue without an explicit grant of authority from the 
state legislature.  The inherent limitations of this approach became apparent during the late 1800s 
and early 1900s, as cities began to expand rapidly for the first time in the United States.  Growing 
urban populations gave rise to health concerns, crime, and need for land use controls, and local 
populations demanded action on these issues.  It became increasingly clear that cities faced a 
number of unique problems, and that state legislatures were not well-positioned to act swiftly or 
knowledgeably on these issues.   
Out of these conditions came an idea of governance known as “home rule.”  As a general 
idea, home rule was intended to establish a sphere within which cities could act on their own 
initiative, without specific grants of authority.  Home rule provides, in short, a “legal means to 
decentralize power to the local level.”73  Advocates for home rule were motivated by “a Progressive 
era concern with the limited scope and capacity of municipal governments in the state constitutional 
system.”74  Home rule was also designed to combat the dangers of state control that had been 
evidenced in targeted special legislation, which interfered with appropriate city governance.75  Thus, 
the two underlying goals of the home rule movement were (1) to give cities a degree of initiative in 
city affairs based on a more general grant of authority from the state, and (2) to “give cities an area 
of autonomy immune from state control, even by general legislation.”76  “In contrast to a Dillon’s 
                                                          
73 Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-first Century, 36 Urb. Law. 253, 260 (2004). 
74 Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1337, 1340 
(2009). 
75 Gerald E. Frug and David J. Barron, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 37, Cornell University 
Press: Ithaca (2008). 
76 Gerald E. Frug, Richard T. Ford & David J. Barron, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 168 (4th ed.), American Casebook 
Series, ThomsonWest (2004); see also, e.g., Brian W. Ohm, Some Modern Day Musings on the Police Power, 47 Urb. Law. 625, 
636 (2015); New York State Bar Association, “Report and Recommendations Concerning Constitutional Home Rule,” at 
6, adopted by the Committee on the New York State Constitution (April 2, 2016) (“Beginning in the 19th Century, the 
home rule movement represented a determined effort to provide local governments with autonomy over local affairs 
and freedom from State legislative interference.”). 
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Rule regime that presumes city powerlessness, home rule provides presumptive city authority to 
engage in a wide variety of governmental activities.”77  Early conceptions of home rule took a variety 
of forms and justifications,78 and may have been motivated more by the cause of “good 
government” than local independence for its own sake.79  At a basic level, however, these ideas 
incorporated some of Thomas Cooley’s ideas of local power and independence.80  Running through 
all of these home rule proposals was an understanding that a degree of local decisionmaking, secure 
from state authority, was necessary to allow improved visions of city government to take shape.   
In 1875, Missouri became the first state to include a home rule provision in its constitution,81 
and it was followed by many others.  Today, nearly all states have something akin to home rule, 
although grants of local power take many forms.82  Most broadly, home rule provisions come in 
either constitutional or statutory form,83 named according to the legal form in which the home rule 
protections are packaged.  The constitutional home rule framework predominated at the turn of the 
twentieth century.  Under this scheme, the state constitution carves out a sphere of local authority, 
free of state interference over matters of local significance.84  Because of difficulties in defining the 
local sphere, state legislatures began to shift in the mid-twentieth century to statutory grants that 
gave localities a certain degree of authority, provided that the exercise of local power did not conflict 
                                                          
77 Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 1109, 1134 (2012). 
78 David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2255, 2292-2320 (2003) (presenting three distinct visions of 
home rule that may have existed among its early proponents: the “old conservative city,” which sought to restore city 
governance to a smaller scale, and to narrow the authority of both the local and state governments; the “administrative 
city,” which sought to legitimize the exercise of a range of powers at the local level; and the “social city,” which sought 
to emphasize and support the public and political nature of the cities and secure freedom for local governments to 
undertake the kinds of big projects needed to support its public purposes). 
79 David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2255, 2291 (2003). 
80 Brian W. Ohm, Some Modern Day Musings on the Police Power, 47 Urb. Law. 625, 636 (2015). 
81 Gerald E. Frug, Richard T. Ford & David J. Barron, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 169 (4th ed.), American Casebook 
Series, ThomsonWest (2004). 
82 See Dale Krane, et al., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK, Congressional Quarterly Press: 
Washington, DC (2001); see also, e.g., Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 927, 
944 (2015) (noting the “diversity and distribution of shared governance structures that obtain under the umbrella term 
‘home rule’”). 
83 Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 237, 263 
(2000). 
84 See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1125 (2007). 
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with any state laws.  While scholars have found it difficult to calculate with precision the number of 
constitutional versus legislative home rule states, the majority of states now employ the legislative 
approach.85  For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to say that, under any system, the most 
relevant inquiries for the home rule framework when it comes to state override of local authority are 
the extent of the state versus local interest, and the existence of “general,” versus “special,” 
conflicting state laws. 
Certainly, the grant of home rule powers to cities around the country did not result in their 
independence; while “local governments may have gained some measure of power and formal 
autonomy in the state-local relationship,”86 they remain largely subject to the control of the state 
legislature.87  But the various home rule provisions did result in the conferral of a certain range of 
powers upon localities under which they could operate.88  This power encompasses both self-
governance and police powers,89 the latter of which includes the authority to address environmental 
harms.90  Vesting local governments with this sphere of authority reflected the broader goals of 
providing greater freedom to local governments,91 eliminating particularized state control over 
                                                          
85 Id. at 1125 n.61 (discussing differences in calculating numbers of home rule states in the work of leading scholars). 
86 Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 959, 977 
(2007). 
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88 Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 237, 264-65 
(2000). 
89 See, e.g., Ross Crow, Municipal Regulation of Groundwater and Takings, 44 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 1, 24 (2014) (citing Baldwin v. 
Cnty. of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 891 (1994) for the proposition that the city or county has “police power equal to 
that of the state so long as the local regulations do not conflict with general laws”).  Exercise of police power versus 
home rule authority may have implications for how and when a local law is preempted by state action.  See, e.g., Cleveland 
v. State, 2010-Ohio-6318, ¶ 10, 128 Ohio St. 3d 135, 137 (“Traditionally, we have used a three-part test to evaluate 
conflicts under the Home Rule Amendment. A state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance when (1) the 
ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, (2) the statute is a general law, and (3) 
the ordinance is in conflict with the statute”) (internal quotations omitted). 
90 See, e.g., Kristen van de Biezenbos, Where Oil is King, Fordham Law Review (2016); Michelle Bryan Mudd, “A ‘Constant 
and Difficult Task’: Making Local Land Use Decisions in States with a Constitutional Right to a Healthful 
Environment,” 38 Ecol. L.Q. 1, 5-6 (2011). 
91 See Brian W. Ohm, Some Modern Day Musings on the Police Power, 47 Urb. Law 625, 636 (2015). 
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localities,92 and creating greater accountability in the state legislature for the relationship between 
state and local governments.93 
B. Home Rule Analysis 
As noted, the extent of state powers varies under different home rule frameworks.  While 
there may be as many formulations of home rule as there are states that employ it,94 it can be broken 
down generally into the aforementioned two categories, based on whether home rule powers are 
created by state constitution or statute.  Under either framework, state legislators desiring to 
preempt local action have a great deal of authority to do so. 
a. Constitutional Grants and State Interest 
Early state constitutional grants are often characterized as taking an “imperium in 
imperio”—state within a state—approach to home rule authority.95  These early grants were typified 
by the creation of a separate sphere of local authority within which cities could legislate, free from 
state interference.96  In some states, the determination of this sphere took the form of a list of items 
deemed to be of “local” interest;97 in others, there was not a specific list, but a more general grant of 
                                                          
92 See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2255, 2335 (2003) (noting that early urban reformers “all 
agreed that the state creature idea of local power—in which the scope of local power was determined by particularized 
state legislative commands—was not home rule and was not desirable”); cf. Howard Lee McBain, Home Rule for Cities, 
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Jan. 1915), at 264, 298-99 
(advocating for the adoption of more specific home rule powers in New York, and stating that “I take it, in the first 
place, that historical events have conclusively demonstrated the vanity of the hope that legislatures will, when subject to 
no specific constitutional mandates, always refrain from interfering with the affairs of cities for political or sinister 
purposes; or that they will, even in the absence of ulterior motives, give sufficient attention to special laws relating to the 
government of cities to accomplish an end that is highly to be desired, namely, that city governments should be founded 
upon some understandable principles of political organization, and once founded upon such principles, should not be 
subjected to fragmentary additions and alterations that take no account of the original design of the structure.”) 
93 Philadelphia Home Rule and City-County Consolidation Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 84, 96-97 (1957). 
94 See, e.g., Dale Krane, et al., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 12, Washington DC: CQ Press 
(2001) (“the degree of independence possessed by local governments varies from state to state”). 
95 See, e.g., Joseph F. Zimmerman, State-Local Relations: A Partnership Approach 27, Westport: Praeger (1995). 
96 See, e.g., Dale Krane, et al., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 12, Washington DC: CQ Press 
(2001). 
97 Id. 
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power to local governments over all issues of local concern.98  Thus, in such states, the definition of 
a “state interest” is crucial to any determination of the proper scope of home rule authority.99  The 
boundary lines between state and local interests were not easily drawn, however.  And even when 
grants of authority were specific, the extent of local authority in the face of conflicting state laws 
remained in flux.  When state and local laws conflict, courts may permit the state legislature to 
“enact a law in a functional area provided there is a substantial state concern,” even where it intrudes 
on the sphere carved out for local authority.100  Home rule authority under this framework is 
therefore subject to case-by-case determinations that make it difficult for cities to know the precise 
extent of their powers.101  Ultimately, courts in most major state-local disputes tend to find “a state 
concern and uph[o]ld the state action.”102  In consequence, the so-called imperio approach has been 
“relatively ineffective” in carving out a protected sphere of local authority.103 
b. Legislative Grants and General Legislation 
The difficulties in drawing clear boundaries around a local sphere led many states to begin to 
adopt a form of home rule that “provided local government with an area in which to operate freely, 
subject to the ultimate purview of the state legislature.”104  This grant of authority, also known as the 
“devolution of powers” or the “residual powers” approach,105 is typical in statutory delegations of 
home rule authority to local governments.  Under this framework, local governments are 
                                                          
98 See, e.g., Richard Briffault & Laurie Reynolds, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 282, 
6th ed., ThomsonWest (2004) (noting that imperio home rule provisions often left terms like “local” and “municipal” 
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empowered to act in any area, unless explicitly prohibited by state law.106  This approach differs from 
Dillon’s Rule, which prevents a local government from exercising a power unless specifically 
authorized to do so by the legislature.”107  Local authority may still be altered, however, by general 
laws passed by the state.   
The use of “general laws” as a limit on state preemption authority incorporates prohibitions 
on special legislation found in most state constitutions.108  Under provisions that generally predate 
home rule,109  legislatures in most states are required to preference general legislation over special 
legislation.110  Special legislation refers to the bestowing of particular benefits or prohibitions on 
individual cities.  Broadly speaking, laws are “general” when they apply to all cities in a state, or all 
cities within a particular classification based on size or other characteristics.111  Whatever the 
classification, a general law must “apply equally to each member” of the class, and cannot exempt 
specific members.112  The widespread prohibition on special legislation arose out of concerns around 
the turn of the twentieth century regarding the dominance of state legislative authority and the 
targeting of legislation toward individual municipalities and persons.  Arguments against special 
legislation ranged from legislative meddling in local affairs to facilitation of corruption.113  These 
special legislation clauses were designed to inhibit the ability of state governments to reward or 
penalize specific entities, and to strengthen local governments.114  The statutory home rule approach 
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incorporates these prohibitions by stating that local laws are preempted only by general laws at the 
state level.  In this way, negative measures designed to prevent arbitrary interference by the state 
legislature were woven into more positive grants of local authority.115  Under this framework, the 
proper scope of local authority in the face of a state enactment may therefore depend in large part 
on whether that state law is deemed “general” or “special.”   
III. State Override of Local Environmental Measures 
This organizational structure means that local governments generally derive sufficient 
authority from either home rule grants or underlying police power to allow them to take action to 
protect the local environment.116  Thus, the question of whether local governments have the 
authority to act in the first instance is fairly settled.  As cities assert their independence in a variety of 
policy spheres,117 however, the exercise of that power has caused a number of localities to come into 
conflict with the state.  This is particularly evident in the environmental context; “states, in addition 
to being sites of innovation and flexibility and pragmatism, are sites of environmental conflicts quite 
as intense as those at the federal level.”118 
One example of localities taking different stances on environmental issues than their states is 
in the area of climate change.  Cities have taken an active role in advocating for action in this arena.  
For instance, the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement was launched on February 16, 2005, 
the day that the Kyoto Protocol went into effect, and was intended as a response to federal inaction 
                                                          
115 See Joseph F. Zimmerman, STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS: A PARTNERSHIP APPROACH 25, Westport: Praeger (1995). 
116 Michelle Bryan Mudd, “A ‘Constant and Difficult Task’: Making Local Land Use Decisions in States with a 
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on climate change and failure to ratify the Protocol.119  That Agreement specifically lists a number of 
actions that mayors may take to meet or exceed the Protocol goals in their cities.120  Similar views 
have given rise to a conflict between state and local governments over the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) Clean Power Plan, where 26 state attorneys general have filed suit against EPA, but 
the National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and numerous individual cities are 
participating as amici in support of EPA’s plan.121  On these issues, some cities have staked out policy 
and litigation stances independent of their parent states.  Such actions do not constitute local laws, 
and they may be less susceptible to undermining via state intervention.  But in response to similar 
conflicts that have manifested in environmental lawmaking on the part of local governments,122 
states have acted to revoke authority from localities on the issues in question. 
One explanation for the rise of these state and local dynamics may be the intertwining of 
conservative politics and animus toward environmental protections.123  The influence of partisan 
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L. Rev. 27, 29 (2015) (“the complexity of some new environmental challenges has partisans coping with their ignorance 
with reflexive skepticism and instinctive hostility to proxy enemies.  Arguments over climate change, hydraulic 
fracturing, and the genetic modification of foods have each generated a good deal more heat than light, in part because 
solid conclusions have remained elusive.”). 
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politics on the state and local relationship has long been an American reality.124  In parts of the 
country with a more conservative statewide bent, cities are often more amenable—and potentially 
more in need—of environmental regulation.  When cities attempt to act out those goals of the urban 
populace, state lawmakers may work to reject this kind of policymaking in their states.  Another 
explanation is the success of business interests at the state level, and corporate interests that value 
uniform standards over local innovation.125   
Whatever the motivation, removal of local authority to act on environmental issues has 
become a risk for local governments acting to exercise independent authority.  Unlike conflicts 
between the federal and state governments, strongly articulated principles of federalism do not 
advocate in favor of one body versus another.  Instead, states can accomplish the alteration of local 
power in a number of ways, without implicating in most cases larger principles of allocation of 
power.  States may, for instance, pass their own regulatory schemes that take over the field.  In such 
cases, even when a state legislature does not explicitly state its intent to do away with local laws, 
passage of the state scheme will often be sufficient to impliedly preempt any separate local action.  
States may also expressly declare their intent to preempt local laws when establishing a 
comprehensive—or quasi-comprehensive—set of rules governing an issue.  Finally, and most 
relevant here, states can pass a law that does nothing more than remove local power over a certain 
                                                          
124 Frank J. Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule, 21 Political Science Quarterly 1, 88 (1906) (“[t]he legislature, which under the 
American system exercises the state control over cities, is, and must of necessity be, the most distinctly political body in 
the state.  It is in the legislature that questions of state policy must be determined.  In the elections to the state 
legislature, party influences must be controlling.  It is almost futile to expect that a body whose members are selected as 
a result of a distinctly political struggle and whose functions are so exclusively political in character, shall, when it comes 
to exercise its control over cities, cease to be governed by partisan political considerations.  That a large portion of the 
legislation of the American commonwealths with regard to city affairs has been and is actuated by such considerations is 
a fact so well known that neither evidence nor illustration is needed; it is a fact of which public opinion takes judicial 
notice.”) 
125 See, e.g., Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1134 (2007) (“The most common opponents of the 
assertion of local authority for regulatory purposes are businesses.) 
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issue.  All of these state actions reflect attempts to alter the authority that would otherwise be 
enjoyed by local governments under the home rule framework. 
A. Types of State Action 
1. Implied Removal of Local Authority 
Much of the discussion on state control over local environmental authority to date has 
focused on the ways in which courts assess whether a local regulation conflicts with, and is 
preempted by, state law.126  Such preemption can occur in several ways.  First, it may be an implied 
consequence of state action on a particular subject.  The Supreme Court and others have recognized 
two forms of implied preemption: field preemption and conflict preemption.127  In the former, 
judges may see state occupancy of a field as eliminating local authority to act on related issues.  “The 
more pervasively and thoroughly the legislature has regulated a field, the argument goes, the more 
likely it is that the state legislature ‘intended’ to completely occupy that field and not allow for local 
regulation, even if the legislature never expressly declared such an intent.”128   
The other kind of implied preemption is known as conflict preemption.  The conflict 
preemption analysis can be further divided into “physical impossibility” and “obstacle” categories.129  
The physical impossibility test is limited to those cases “in which it would be literally impossible for 
someone to comply with both statutes;”130 stated another way, the question is whether a local 
ordinance “permits an act prohibited by a statute or prohibits an act permitted by a statute.”131  If 
state law is construed to permit everything not prohibited, then the possibility for preemption of 
                                                          
126 See, e.g., Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 927, 966-975 (2015); Paul 
Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1126-27 (2007). 
127 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
128 Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1153 (2007). 
129 Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine 131, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND 
REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION, William Buzbee, ed., New York: Cambridge University Press (2009). 
130 Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine 131, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND 
REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION, William Buzbee, ed., New York: Cambridge University Press (2009). 
131 Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1142 (2007). 
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local measures under this theory is very strong.132  Even without such a strong interpretation of 
conflict, preemption may occur where a state or local measure presents an “obstacle” to achieving 
the purposes and objectives of, respectively, the federal or state statute.133   
In the environmental context, implied preemption has come up in a number of cases 
involving local limits on natural gas extraction accomplished via hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking.”  
For instance, in West Virginia, a local fracking ban was found to be preempted by provisions in the 
West Virginia Code.  The court relied on “the State’s interest in oil and gas development and 
production throughout the State” to find that the Code should be interpreted to provide for 
exclusive control of oil and gas development by the West Virginia Department of Environmental 
Protection.134  Colorado courts have also employed an implied preemption analysis to assess whether 
local regulations pose “operational conflicts with state objectives.”135  Other courts, including those 
in New York and Pennsylvania, have considered local fracking regulations within the context of 
existing state oil and gas law, and found that such state laws could not be read to imply total 
preemption of the field.136  As a result, local measures regulating some aspects of fracking were 
permitted.  This kind of implied preemption analysis may be employed whenever arguably relevant 
state law operates as a backdrop to a local activity; the precise analysis will vary by state. 
2. Express Removal of Local Authority 
                                                          
132 Id. 
133 Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine 132, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND 
REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION, William Buzbee, ed., New York: Cambridge University Press (2009). 
134 Id. at 968 (citing Northeast Natural Energy LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, at * 9 (W. Va. 
Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011). 
135 Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 927, 969 (2015); City of Longmont 
Colorado, et al. v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, et al., 2016 Colo. 29 (Sup. Ct. Colo.) (finding an “operational conflict” 
between city fracking bans and applicable state law, and therefore finding city ban preempted and unenforceable). 
136 Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 927, 966-68, 970-71 (2015) (discussing 
Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 23 N.Y.3d 728 (N.Y. 2014) and Huntley & Huntley v. Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855 (Pa. 
2009)). 
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State removal of local authority may also come much more directly, in two different ways. 
First, express preemption of local authority may be accomplished through state legislation on a 
subject that includes a clause expressly preempting local authority to regulate in the area. 137  
Although courts may again engage in various interpretations of legislative intent when confronted 
with apparently express preemption,138 “[i]t is well established that within constitutional limits 
Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in express terms.”139  The same is true of state 
legislatures.  Thus, a state may preempt local laws by regulating in the same field as a local 
government, and noting its intent to preempt local authority.  Second, and distinctly, states may 
enact legislation explicitly aimed at circumscribing the grant of home rule power with regard to a 
particular issue.  Such laws do not establish state law in the area, but instead function only to remove 
local authority to regulate on the topic in question.140  This kind of removal of local authority does 
not implicate preemption doctrine, but rather gets to the heart of home rule authority.  Express 
removal of authority can take either of these forms, or may be a hybrid of the two.141   
The focus of this Article is on those instances where the explicit removal of local authority is 
the sole or primary function of the state legislation.  It therefore does not undermine the analysis 
here to concede that where a state has a long history of regulation in an area that would rise to the 
                                                          
137 Indeed, some state courts require an express statement of intent to preempt before any such preemption will be 
found.  See, e.g., Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 927, 968, 983 (2015) 
(describing New York and Kansas state courts as “avoiding intrastate preemption absent express legislative intent”). 
138 Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine 122-24, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, 
AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION, William Buzbee, ed., New York: Cambridge University Press (2009) 
(describing interpretive principles related to express preemption). 
139 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983). 
140 See, e.g., Kristen van de Biezenbos, Where Oil is King, Fordham Law Review (2016) (describing examples of targeted 
preemption of local authority to regulate natural gas extraction). 
141 See, e.g., Texas House Bill 40 (2014) (House Bill 40 cites the state framework for regulation of oil and gas activities and 
notes that “[i]t is in the interest of this state to explicitly confirm the authority to regulate oil and gas operations in this 
state. The legislature intends that this Act expressly preempt the regulation of oil and gas operations by municipalities 
and other political subdivisions, which is impliedly preempted by the statutes already in effect.”  H.B. 40 goes on to 
more explicitly remove the authority of local governments to “enact or enforce an ordinance or other measure, or an 
amendment or revision of an ordinance or other measure, that bans, limits, or otherwise regulates an oil and gas 
operation within the boundaries or extraterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality or political subdivision.”). 
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level of occupation of the field, or passes new, comprehensive regulations, a state law that also 
includes an express preemption clause may not be governed by the discussion below.  State actors 
are generally sophisticated, however, and removal of local authority is almost universally 
accompanied by statements of state interest in and occupation of a particular field.  Thus, expressly 
carving out the framework in this Article from those instances where a state asserts its interest, or 
gestures to state laws that do not truly occupy a field, would create an artificial and unhelpful 
distinction.  We are talking here about explicit removal of local lawmaking authority over particular 
matters, where the rules of preemption are inapplicable because of the lack of substantive state 
regulation on the subject. 
Reactive, targeted elimination of local authority by state legislatures goes beyond the more 
typical move of state legislatures that would preempt local laws by establishing statewide schemes of 
maximum, minimum, or non-discretionary standards.142  At the core of the new elimination of local 
authority appears to be “state decision makers’ suspicions about local decision making,”143 and the 
growing prevalence of these state actions may give the lie to arguments advanced by some local 
government scholars that “direct state efforts to overturn local governmental decisions are relatively 
rare.”144  As partisan splits and views on environmental policy continue to divide the state and local 
levels of government, such attempts to stop local action frowned upon by the state may become 
more frequent.  These state efforts may operate to limit local involvement in environmental law and 
policy,145 and to thereby ensure that certain environmental issues are left unaddressed. 
                                                          
142 See, e.g., Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 
237, 268 (2000) (describing state preemption of local laws exclusively in terms of standard-setting). 
143 Gerald E. Frug and David J. Barron, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 143, Cornell 
University Press: Ithaca (2008). 
144 Id. at 33 (characterizing literature of local government scholars such as Richard Briffault that attribute a considerable 
amount of power to local governments). 
145 Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 237, 238 
(2000). 
 28 
 
While far from a new trend,146 the targeted removal of local authority over environmental 
and other matters has negative consequences.  Such state action can pose a threat to local 
innovation147 and ideals of governance, as it “suppresses the interest of municipal citizens to 
participate directly in decisionmaking which affects them.”148  Moreover, this state behavior is 
contrary to the very goals of the home rule movement.  That movement was designed to get away 
from piecemeal grants of authorities to localities,149 and the influence of special interests at the state 
level.  Systematic removal of local authority because states dislike or disagree with local policy 
solutions undermines the intention of home rule, as well as citizen involvement and the ability to 
work toward a clean environment.150  Using plastic bag bans as an example, the discussion below will 
show how the current state of the law may fail to protect against targeted state removal of local 
authority over environmental measures. 
B. Case Study—Banning Bag Bans 
                                                          
146 Gerald E. Frug, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 53, Princeton University 
Press: Princeton (1999) (“it seems ironic that city powerlessness became firmly established as a legal principle during the 
last few decades of the nineteenth century, the period described in Arthur Schlesinger’s seminal history of cities entitled 
The Rise of the City.  On the other hand, it may not be ironic at all.  As Schlesinger argues, urbanization reinforced the felt 
need for controls over city power.”) 
147 Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1114 (2007) (“the primary threat to local innovation is the 
charge of intrastate preemption”); cf. Dale Krane, et al., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 2, CQ 
Press: Washington, DC (2001) (noting that “possessing substantial freedom from state government control is vital for 
the development of dynamic communities”). 
148 George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise of Municipal Power in Home Rule, 22 Stetson L. Rev. 
643, 644 (1993); see also Rita Barnett-Rose, Judicially Modified Democracy: Court and State Pre-Emption of Local Gmo Regulation in 
Hawaii and Beyond, 26 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 71, 105 (2015) (“by finding that the local ordinances were pre-empted by 
state and federal law, the district court did make the radical decision to remove local citizen participation in the 
democratic process”); David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 351 (Dec. 2014)(describing 
the “long tradition in economics, positive theory, and other quasi-utilitarian traditions of examining jurisdictional 
conflicts . . . using the matching principle, which would house regulatory authority at the lowest level of government that 
encompasses (geographically) the costs and benefits of the regulated activity”). 
149 Cf. Christopher W. Hammons, State Constitutional Reform: Is It Necessary?, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1327, 1347 n.122 (2001) 
(noting that, in New York,  “[t]he Citizen's Union argued for greater home rule for cities, and suggested that the 
piecemeal amendments adopted between 1894 and 1938 had created much obsolete or partially inapplicable matter in 
the state Constitution, which needed to be excised.”); Joni Armstrong Coffey, The Case for Fiscal Home Rule, Fla. B.J., 
APRIL 1997, at 54, 55. 
150 Cf. William A. Shutkin, THE LAND THAT COULD BE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 128, MIT Press (2000) (noting the importance of “meaningful, informed participation in the 
decisionmaking procedures that affect the quality of people’s lives” for civic democratic practice and, in turn, civic 
environmentalism). 
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A more specific example may help to elucidate the type of state action at issue.  Plastic bag 
bans, and bans on those bag bans, provide a straightforward instance of targeted state preemption of 
local measures.  This Article will provide a brief background on the ways in which these bans have 
been implemented in a number of states.  It will then assess how challenges to such state laws would 
proceed under a typical home rule analysis.   
Briefly, common practice throughout the United States has long been to distribute plastic 
bags freely along with any purchase.  The waste and pollution that results from the production and 
disposal of all of these plastic bags is a matter of concern for many localities.151  In an effort to 
discourage use of these bags, a number of municipalities have passed laws mandating that retailers 
charge a fee for any plastic bags they hand out; some have banned the use of plastic bags entirely.152  
These laws are intended to remedy the pollution of landscape and water attributable to disposal of 
plastic bags, prevent that waste from ending up in a landfill, and correct for the difficulty of 
recycling this type of material.153  Although there are currently robust debates being had about 
whether such bans result in net positive environmental impacts,154 it appears uncontroverted that 
cities that have instituted such fines and bans have seen a significant drop in plastic bag use.  In 
many instances, these fees or bans form part of a larger environmental and sustainability portfolio 
for cities. 
                                                          
151 See, e.g., Chris Gibson, et al., HOUSEHOLD SUSTAINABILITY: CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 91-92, 
Edward Elgar: Cheltenham (2013). 
152 Comprehensive information on these kinds of bans and charges nationwide is available via Novolex, a packaging 
company.  To use mapping tool to find information on all 50 states, see, e.g., http://www.bagtheban.com/in-your-state.  
153 See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Is It Time to Bag the Plastic?,” THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sunday Review (May 18, 2013) 
(“plastic bags are the bane of recycling programs;” the bags themselves are very difficult to recycle, and, when placed 
into bins with general plastic, the plastic bags “jam and damage expensive sorting machines, which cost huge amounts to 
repair.”) 
154 See, e.g., Chris Gibson, et al., HOUSEHOLD SUSTAINABILITY: CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 94-95, 
97-98, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham (2013). 
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Bans on plastic are not a new solution,155 nor are they limited to the United States.156  Within 
this country, however, some states have responded to local measures by, in essence, banning bag 
bans.  State action to date has not involved explicit regulation of plastic bags or containers, but has 
instead contained only a prohibition on local action.  For instance, following a local measure in 
Tucson, Arizona that banned the use of plastic bags by local businesses, the state of Arizona passed 
a law in 2015 stating that cities and counties may neither “regulate the sale, use, or disposition of 
auxiliary containers,” nor “impose a tax, fee, assessment, charge or return deposit” for auxiliary 
containers.157  Similarly, after Columbia, Missouri enacted a ban on plastic bags, the state legislature 
enacted a measure to prohibit these kinds of local laws.  Missouri’s version of a ban on bag bans—
passed over a governor’s veto—states that all merchants doing business in the state “must have the 
option to provide customers with a paper or plastic bag for any item or good purchased.  A political 
subdivision cannot impose any ban, fee, or tax upon the use of paper or plastic bags for packaging 
any item or good purchased or prohibit a consumer from using a reusable bag.”158  And Indiana has 
passed a law revoking from its grant of home rule “the power to . . . ‘regulate, or adopt or enforce 
an ordinance to regulate” the manufacture, distribution, sale, provision, use, or disposition or 
                                                          
155 See, e.g., Joan Mullany, POPPING THE PLASTICS QUESTION: PLASTICS RECYCLING AND BANS ON PLASTICS—
CONTACTS, RESOURCES AND LEGISLATION 8-12, Issue Brief, National League of Cities (1990) (describing bans on 
plastic, Styrofoam, and other products in states and cities around the country). 
156 See, e.g., Chris Gibson, et al., HOUSEHOLD SUSTAINABILITY: CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 92, 
Edward Elgar: Cheltenham (2013) (describing bans on plastic in South Africa, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Italy, 
and France). 
157 Arizona SB 1241 (2015).  After a lawsuit was filed challenging the legitimacy of SB 1241 for, among other things, 
violating the title and single-subject mandates in the state constitution, a revised version of the bill was passed in 2016.  
See HB 2131, House Summary 3.14.16. 
158 Missouri HB 722. 
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disposal of auxiliary containers, or impose any prohibition, restriction, fee, or tax with respect to 
auxiliary containers.”159  Similar actions have been taken in Wisconsin,160 Idaho,161 and Michigan.162   
In Arizona, the statewide ban on plastic bag bans has been challenged in court on a number 
of bases, including violation of the state’s home rule doctrine.163  The plaintiff in that lawsuit is a 
member of the City Council in Tempe, Arizona; she alleges that the Council in Tempe was prepared 
to move forward on a local bag ban, but the process was disrupted by SB 1241.164  No decision has 
yet been issued in this case.  It may be possible, however, to predict the likelihood of success of this 
claim under a traditional home rule analysis.  The analysis below will discuss the possible ways that a 
court might rule on this issue.  Arizona is a constitutional home rule state, and the claim against the 
state’s ban on bag bans based on home rule grounds was styled as an infringement on an area of 
local interest.  Discussion of the state and local spheres relevant to this issue is therefore warranted.  
Further, this Article will take the liberty of projecting what might happen if the same kind of ban 
were passed in a legislative home rule state, where determinations of home rule authority depend 
more on an assessment of the state action as general legislation.  While both analyses will necessarily 
vary by state, and by the language of the state and local legislation at issue, Arizona’s example may 
provide a helpful demonstration of the barriers that local environmental measures face when 
confronted with targeted state action. 
1. Constitutional Home Rule 
                                                          
159 House Enrolled Act No. 1053, State of Indiana, Second Regular Session of the 119th General Assembly (2016) 
(amending Section IC 36-1-3-8).  Far from being a typical course of action by the state government, the only other 
example of this kind of removal of local power in Indiana’s home rule statute is directed at local measures requiring 
participation in a Section 8 housing program or similar programs.  IC 36-1-3-8; 36-1-3-8.5. 
160 W.S.A. § 66.0419 adopted by 2015 A.B. 730. 
161 2016 House Bill No. 372.   
162 Michigan Public Act 389 (2016). 
163 Kuby v. Arizona, CV 2015-011434, Dkt. 1. 
164 Id. 
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As noted, in states with constitutional home rule provisions, localities are generally granted 
authority over all topics of local concern.  The determination of whether something is of local 
concern is left to the courts, conferring a great deal of power upon the judiciary.  Judicial assessment 
of the “local” nature of an issue generally comes down to a multi-factored analysis,165 and it is often 
difficult to predict whether a court will characterize a particular topic as a matter of state or local 
interest.166  Historically, however, courts have given broad constructions to state interests and 
narrower interpretations to their local counterparts. 
In Arizona, the state constitution establishes the right of cities to frame a charter for their 
own government.167  There are nineteen different charter cities in Arizona, each with unique 
charters.168  These cities must act according to the powers laid out in their charters; thus, they must 
be able to point to specific grants of authority that either directly or impliedly provide authority for 
any action taken.169  In general, the charter power includes “all that is necessary or incident to the 
government of the municipality[.]”170  Arizona courts have read grants of charter authority to 
impliedly include the police power, which can be used to address things like regulation of billboard 
lighting171 and fencing requirements.172  In other circumstances, however, such as the tax power,173 
courts have found local action improper absent a more specific grant of authority.   
“[W]here a home rule city has power by its charter it may act in conformity with such power 
not only in matters of local concern, but also in matters of state-wide concern, within its territorial 
                                                          
165 Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1337, 1351 
(2009). 
166 See Darin M. Dalmat, Bringing Economic Justice Closer to Home: the Legal Viability of Local Minimum Wage Laws Under Home 
Rule, 39 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 93, 105 (2005). 
167 Ariz. Const. art. XIII, § 2. 
168 City of Tucson v. State, 229 Ariz. 172, 174, 273 P.3d 624, 626 (2012). 
169 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Allt, 25 Ariz. App. 565, 570, 545 P.2d 76, 81 (1976). 
170 City of Tucson v. Walker, 60 Ariz. 232, 238, 135 P.2d 223, 226 (1943). 
171 See Whiteco Outdoor Advert. v. City of Tucson, 193 Ariz. 314, 318, 972 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. App. 1998). 
172 Arizona Fence Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phoenix Advisory & Appeals Bd., 7 Ariz. App. 129, 131, 436 P.2d 641, 643 
(1968). 
173 Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Arizona, Inc. v. Riddel, 109 Ariz. 404, 406, 510 P.2d 376, 378 (1973). 
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limits,” provided there are no conflicting state rules.174  There appears to be no bright-line test for 
establishing whether something is of state or local concern.  Instead, courts engage in highly fact-
intensive inquiries, looking at the characteristics of the action and its relative impacts at the state or 
local level.175  The state is barred from regulating the conduct of local governments on purely local 
issues.  Assuming proper authority on the part of the city, however, both cities and states “may 
legislate on the same subject when that subject is of local concern or when, though the subject is not 
of local concern, the charter or particular state legislation confers on the city express power to 
legislate thereon.”176  But where “the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature has 
appropriated the field by enacting a statute pertaining thereto, that statute governs throughout the 
state, and local ordinances contrary thereto are invalid.”177   
 In the context of the challenge to bag bans as applied in Tempe, there seems to be a good 
argument that regulation of bags would be a proper exercise of local power in Arizona.  Bag 
pollution has a localized impact on environmental health, and cities are granted police powers to 
address such issues.178  The state may still, however, be able to regulate in the area if it establishes a 
simultaneous state interest.  Senate Bill 1241 certainly attempts to do this, stating plainly that “[t]he 
regulation of the sale, use and disposition of auxiliary containers is a matter of statewide concern.”179  
                                                          
174 City of Tucson v. Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. 1, 6, 164 P.2d 598, 601 (1945). 
175 Strode v. Sullivan, 72 Ariz. 360, 366, 236 P.2d 48, 52 (1951) (detailing the “court’s views on different fact situations” 
with regard to whether the subject matter of a local law “was of local concern or statewide interest.”); see also, e.g., City of 
Tucson v. State, 235 Ariz. 434, 440 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding that rules governing local elections are solely of local interest); 
City of Phoenix v. Harnish, 214 Ariz. 158, 164 (Ct. App. 2006) (eminent domain is a matter of state interest). 
176 City of Tucson v. Rineer, 193 Ariz. 160, 162, 971 P.2d 207, 209 (Ct. App. 1998). 
177 Id. 
178 See Tempe, Arizona City Charter, available at http://www.tempe.gov/home/showdocument?id=8594 (“The 
municipal corporation now existing and known as the ‘City of Tempe’ shall remain and continue to be a body politic and 
corporate under the name of the ‘City of Tempe’ with all powers, functions, rights, privileges and immunities possible 
under the Constitution and general laws of Arizona as fully as though they were specifically enumerated in this Charter, 
and all of the powers, functions, rights, privileges and immunities granted or to be granted to charter cities and to cities 
and towns incorporated under the provisions of Title 9, Arizona Revised Statutes, not in conflict herewith. The 
enumeration of the powers, functions, rights, privileges and immunities made in this Charter shall never be construed to 
preclude, by implication, or otherwise, the city from doing any and all things not inhibited by the constitution and laws 
of Arizona.”). 
179 SB 1241. 
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The precise question of whether such regulations, or, more broadly, uniform business or 
environmental standards, constitute a state interest has not been decided in Arizona.  Given the 
general latitude in assessing whether something of state interest, however, it appears likely that 
regulation of auxiliary containers would be deemed of state interest, and that the state would be 
permitted to override local bans.180  Home rule challenges to the ban on bag bans would therefore 
likely be unsuccessful under a traditional analysis that ends at this point. 
2. Legislative Home Rule 
As noted, Arizona employs a system of constitutional home rule through charter grants.  To 
make the discussion more nationally applicable, however, this Article will also take the liberty of 
extrapolating similar facts to a legislative home rule system to see how local bag bans would fare in 
that situation.  Generally speaking, in states using legislative grants of home rule authority, that 
authority is expressly limited by conflicting general state laws.181  Thus, local authority is permitted 
only as long as the state has not issued a contrary statement.182  Any flexibility that courts may have 
to preserve local autonomy using flexible interpretations of state and local interests therefore does 
not apply in such systems.183  “When a state legislature in a legislative home rule state does expressly 
deny localities the power to act in a field, the state denial of local power is conclusive and 
successfully preempts the local ordinance, unless that prohibition itself is wrongful.”184   
                                                          
180 See, e.g., City of Tucson v. State, 957 P.2d 341, 344 (Ct. App. 1997) (noting that, in deciding whether something is of 
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181 See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. X, § 11 (2009) (“A home rule borough or city may exercise all legislative powers not 
prohibited by law or by charter.”). 
182 Cf. Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 69, Cornell 
University Press: Ithaca (2008) (noting that, in Massachusetts, the home rule grant permits cities “to act when the state 
legislature has not said [they] cannot act”).   
183 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—the Structure of Local Government Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1999) (suggesting 
possible ways in which courts can avoid head-to-head conflicts between state and local laws). 
184 See Darin M. Dalmat, Bringing Economic Justice Closer to Home: the Legal Viability of Local Minimum Wage Laws Under Home 
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One of the only real limitations on this kind of denial of local power is the prohibition 
against special legislation.185  As noted, special legislation is legislation that treats cities, or classes of 
cities, within a state differently.  Functionally, prohibitions on special legislation have not presented a 
great barrier to state action.  Generally speaking, “it is not what a law includes that makes it 
unconstitutional as a special law, but what it excludes.”186  While states apply a variety of tests, the 
formulation generally looks only to whether the law “applies alike to all local governments in terms 
and in effect.”187  If that is the case—and even if it is not, where certain exceptions apply188—the 
prohibition on special legislation will not block a state’s ability to act.  Arizona’s bag ban applies to 
all cities and counties in the state; therefore, it is likely to be found to be a general law under a 
traditional analysis.189 
The analysis for a variety of environmental initiatives by localities would likely look similar to 
that for bag bans in both constitutional and statutory home rule states.  In consequence, the 
narrative to date has been that little can be done in terms of the home rule framework to combat 
state measures that target local action.190  The historic deference to state action, and legal ambiguity 
of localities, makes it possible for states to chill the experimentation of their local governments on a 
number of policy issues.  For this reason, conventional wisdom to date appears to have been that 
there is little to be done to combat reactive state legislation in the environmental context, at least 
within the confines of the home rule analysis. 
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IV. Judicial Allocation of State and Local Power 
Thus, if the protection of local progressivism from reactive state laws is going to occur, it is 
likely to require answers beyond the home rule framework as traditionally applied.  That does not 
mean, however, that those who wish to advance local environmental policies are necessarily without 
recourse.  Running parallel to the strict formulations of home rule are a number of cases in which 
judges, under a variety of rationales, decide questions of power allocation in favor of the locality.  
Where judges are asked to assess actions by a higher level of government that appear designed 
principally to eliminate authority at a lower level, they may alter their analysis of state and local 
relations to reveal and halt these state goals.  This tendency for judges to assume an active role in 
allocating authority between state and local has a long history in local government law, dating back 
to the debates between Judges Dillon and Cooley.  Courts have long been a powerful influence in 
determining the proper allocation of state and local authority and how best to interpret the strictures 
of home rule in a given situation.191 
The willingness of judges in some instances to step outside the more formal, rigid 
subordination of the local to the state has been deemed the “shadow doctrine” of local government 
law.192  Elements of the Supreme Court’s line of so-called “animus” cases related to the Equal 
Protection Clause may form another part of this shadowy element of local government law.  Both 
kinds of cases, described in greater detail below, have provided bulwarks in some instances against 
state incursions on local authority, and they illustrate a longstanding truth about home rule: given the 
lack of constitutional language governing the distribution of power between state and local 
governments, judge-made doctrine and assumptions play a sizable role in the final outcome of home 
                                                          
191 Cf. Neil Littlefield, METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS AND MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 18, Buffalo: William S. Hein & 
Co., Inc. (1985) (“The doctrine of an exclusive power of a city with respect to its municipal affairs is entirely a judicial 
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192 Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore and the Political Currency of Local Government, 50 Buff. L. 
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rule determinations.  Neither the “shadow doctrine” as it currently stands, nor the equal protection 
doctrine, are likely to be easily applied in the environmental context.  But their ability to preserve 
local policymaking may point to other means of forging a path forward.  To the extent that 
applicable substantive protections can be found, courts may be empowered to push back against 
reactive state action in the face of local environmental policymaking.   
A. The “Shadow Doctrine” of Local Government Law 
In discussing the legacy of Dillon’s Rule and the modern realities of home rule, a number of 
scholars have made the case that there exists a protected sphere of judicially recognized local 
authority.  While this sphere is bound by no explicit rules, its presence has nonetheless been posited 
as an explanation for why certain cases come out differently in the home rule framework.  Courts 
may decide conflicts in favor of localities under this “shadow doctrine” of local government law 
where they are motivated to find “that communities should be empowered to choose policies 
consonant with local values.”193  Thus, in fields such as zoning, land use, and school financing and 
districting, courts have often upheld local authority against intrusions by the state.194   
While these cases point to a means by which judges have elected to escape the strict 
outcomes of the home rule analysis, they are unlikely to apply well to environmental law cases across 
the board.  Although land use and zoning have been recognized as matters predominantly of local 
authority, the same kinds of cases do not appear to exist more generally for environmental law.  
That result is perhaps not unusual; as noted, many environmental issues and impacts bleed beyond 
local boundaries.  Thus, unlike some fields involving entirely local impacts,195 the opposite principles 
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are often in play in the environmental context, where there has long been a push toward lawmaking 
at increasingly higher levels of government.  An argument could, of course, be advanced for looking 
at environmental issues on a case by case basis.  But without a principle as to why local laws should 
govern on such topics, and without a more specific grounding principle, environmental law as a 
uniquely local endeavor is a hard case to make.  In consequence, while the “shadow doctrine” may 
provide an exception to the home rule analysis for certain kinds of cases, it is unlikely to offer any 
particular relief in the bag ban example, or in other kinds of reactive, targeted state legislation aimed 
at local environmental measures.   
B. Federal Constitutional Provisions 
Another example of local government-friendly outcomes in assessing state and local 
conflicts comes from a series of decisions by the United States Supreme Court.  These cases have 
considered scenarios that, like bans on bag bans, are targeted state removals of local authority to 
carry out what might be characterized as progressive policies.  In these cases, the Court has 
questioned states’ ability to eliminate local power to enact laws that advance the individual liberties 
of citizens.  The analysis in these cases has not proceeded along the lines of typical equal protection 
doctrine analysis.  While many explanations for this deviation have been proffered, one that a 
number of scholars have adopted is a view of the animus cases as a protection of local 
experimentation, a desire to weed out state behavior motivated by animus, or both.196   
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution protects against state 
legislation that improperly creates classes of persons and treats like classes differently.  At the core 
of the Clause’s protections is an insistence that “government classifications be both rational and free 
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of illegitimate motivations such as simple dislike of the burdened group.”197  The Equal Protection 
Clause vindicates individual rights, not rights of geographic areas or communities.198  However, 
those “[i]ndividual rights in the Constitution constrain state power over municipalities.”199  Thus, “if 
a state violates the constitutional rights of individuals, the fact that it does so by changing municipal 
powers . . . does not insulate it from suit.”200  Equal protection doctrine therefore provides an 
additional layer of consideration to the typical home rule analysis.  In addition to the factors already 
discussed, the state cannot make changes to local powers that violate the constitutional rights of its 
citizens.201 
The Supreme Court made this point explicit in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  In 
Romer, the Supreme Court considered another reaction at the state level against local progressivism.  
In the early 1990s, several cities in Colorado passed laws banning discrimination based on sexual 
orientation in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, health and welfare services, 
and other transactions and activities.  In response, voters in Colorado adopted by referendum 
Amendment 2, which “prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or 
local government designed to protect the named class”—that is, “homosexual persons or gays and 
lesbians.”202  The Romer plaintiffs challenged Amendment 2 as unconstitutional on equal protection 
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grounds.  Colorado state courts found that Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny because it 
infringed the fundamental rights of those affected, and therefore enjoined its enforcement.203  The 
case then came before the Supreme Court. 
The Court’s equal protection analysis typically looks first to the persons affected by the 
challenged action.  If the affected persons are part of a protected class, the Court will apply strict 
scrutiny to the law; if they are not, then the Court will look only for whether there is a rational basis 
for the legislation.204  The Romer Court did not find that the affected groups constituted a protected 
class.  Nor did it engage in traditional rational basis review, which would have provided for 
substantial deference to be given to the state’s proffered explanation for the legislation.  Instead, it 
engaged in what it called rational basis review of the Amendment, but found that, because the law 
was rooted in legislative animus, it was not supported by a rational basis.205  Finding no “identifiable 
legitimate purpose or discrete objective” to the law other than discrimination against a certain class, 
the Court deemed it impermissible class legislation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.206 
Thus, the Romer Court did not apply a traditional suspect class formulation to the question of 
whether Amendment 2 was permissible.  Instead, it employed a rational basis analysis, and found 
that animus on the part of the legislature cannot form a rational basis for a law.  In this way, the case 
represented a step outside the traditional deference afforded legislatures under the rational basis 
framework, and offered a means by which the Court could peer behind the law to more closely 
examine its motivations.  The perception of animus on the part of the state in Romer appears to have 
been the driving factor in this analysis; the same could potentially also be said of United States 
                                                          
203 Id. at 626. 
204 Id. at 631 (1996). 
205 Id. at 634 (“laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of 
animosity toward the class of persons affected”). 
206 Id. at 635. 
 41 
 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno207 and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.208  Together, these 
cases provide a foundation for the Court’s “anti-animus metholology” that was expanded in 
Windsor.209  The foundation of such an anti-animus bent is “that just as individuals have a moral and 
sometimes legal duty not to act maliciously toward others, the group of people elected as 
representatives . . . has a moral and sometimes constitutional duty not to act maliciously toward a 
person or group of people.210  Therefore, “legislation must have some substantial justification 
beyond ‘we don’t like you,’ ‘we couldn’t care less about you, or ‘we just want it that way.’”211  Viewed 
through this lens, the animus cases focus more on “legislative process than [on] legislative results;” 
they do not declare a fundamental right to certain benefits, but disallow legislative process motivated 
by a desire to harm a disadvantaged group.212  Of course, critics of the animus cases may characterize 
these opinions as impermissible judicial determination of substantive policy that overrides popular 
will.  In this light, the willingness to step outside the bounds of traditional rational basis review and 
peer behind the curtain to examine legislative motivations is outcome-driven and outcome-
determinative.  Nevertheless, the animus cases have made clear the impermissibility of legislation 
that has as its primary purpose the infliction of injury or indignity.213  In the same way as the special 
legislation doctrine protects against the singling out of particular cities for favorable or unfavorable 
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treatment, the Equal Protection clause protects against such singling out of individuals.214  Thus, the 
“core antianimus requirement” of the Equal Protection Clause215 provides a check on state action 
outside of the home rule framework.   
Several scholars have drawn a more explicit connection between the animus cases and home 
rule.  Romer, Windsor, and others have been characterized as containing “whiffs of federalism,”216 
“traces of local constitutionalism,”217 or, more explicitly, a prohibition on state preemption of 
unpopular local political processes.218  While theories of these decisions as having an element of 
localism vary, the arguments boil down to a rejection of a higher level of government’s interference 
with policy experimentation that will further the rights of citizens at a lower level.219  This process-
based explanation means that the cases establish no substantive guarantees of benefits, but simply 
force the federal or state government to “back off of . . . particular intrusion[s].”220  This kind of 
support of local constitutional enforcement may uphold parochial policies as well as progressive 
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ones.221  But it also ensures that “states may not preclude their local political institutions from 
promoting a norm of constitutional equality that lies beyond direct judicial enforcement.”222  
These cases therefore provide several different ways to think about and challenge state 
action that burdens the ability of localities to protect the constitutional rights of their citizens.223  The 
added layer of protection against state incursion on local authority is unlikely to come into play with 
regard to bag bans or other environmental issues, however.  To be sure, targeted laws at the state 
level that bar certain local actions may be motivated by animus or industry interests.224  As in many 
other areas, local regulations on environmental issues such as plastic bag bans are likely to pique the 
interest of industries that may be affected by the regulation,225 and encourage those industries to seek 
redress at the state level.226  In these fights, localities often lose out to special interests at the state 
level, as they have much weaker relative lobbying influence.227  But while environmental harms 
endanger humans,228 restrictions on environmental protections do not touch on recognized 
individual liberties.  Any inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause, even under the slightly modified 
animus analysis, will require definition of the burdened group, and the rights being burdened.  
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Carving out a special class of persons is difficult in the environmental context, where there is not a 
class of persons being singled out.  Instead, the harm is acted upon a natural resource,229 or, viewed 
another way, on the right of citizens to develop policy solutions for a particular problem.230  In 
consequence, claims invoking the federal Equal Protection Clause to guard against state revocation 
of local authority to act on environmental issues would likely be rejected before any kind of analysis 
of state animus could be reached.  Thus, while the Equal Protection Clause provides some avenues 
around the home rule analysis, it is likely to be difficult to apply in the context of local 
environmental laws. 
C. State Environmental Protections 
Both the “shadow doctrine” of local government law and the animus line of cases and their 
possibly localist underpinnings illustrate the ways in which judges are involved in sorting out state 
and local power.  They also provide a good example of how judges react when uncomfortable with 
the result of the typical division of power.  To date, similar kinds of reasoning have not occurred in 
the environmental law context.  Both courts and scholars have been stymied in combatting the 
targeted preemption of local environmental efforts by the seemingly implacable nature of the 
distribution of state and local power.231  The kinds of reactive state legislation currently being seen, 
however, may offer an impetus for judges to examine more carefully possible bases for protection of 
a local right to innovate in support of environmental protections.  Outside of the home rule context, 
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scholars have recognized that where state constitutions establish a right to a clean environment, state 
ability to forestall local action on an environmental issue may be called into question.232  And even 
where state constitutional protections do not exist, it has been suggested that the public trust 
doctrine could potentially be used as a kind of canon of construction in interpreting state action, 
thereby providing a basis for environmental protection, or at least a barrier to environmental 
degradation.233   
The goal of the discussion below is to incorporate these ideas into the realm of state and 
local government relations.  Again using bans on bag bans as an example, it argues that state 
constitutional protections and the public trust doctrine may provide justification for judicial support 
of local innovation on environmental protection.  Home rule precedent leaves open the door for 
judges to construe state power liberally, and nothing proposed herein is likely to provide absolute 
support for local autonomy.  But there may also be a path open to judges who, confronted with 
reactive, targeted incursions on local solutions, see fit to infuse the traditional analysis of state action 
with layers of environmental protection.  To the extent they exist, state constitutional provisions 
may provide a basis for finding state laws improper at the outset.  And even where such provisions 
are not as straightforward or easily applied, permutations of the public trust doctrine may establish a 
basis for courts to bring a more environmentally friendly home rule analysis out of the shadows. 
1. State Constitutional Provisions 
A number of state constitutions include provisions that establish environmental protections 
for their citizens.  These provisions vary widely in form and scope, and, like home rule provisions, 
their precise number and parameters are difficult to assess.234  In general, these provisions do not 
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impose affirmative duties on a state,235 but establish limits on government action.236  Where these 
protections exist, the home rule analysis may be fairly simple.  Under either a constitutional or 
legislative home rule framework—or whether looking for a state interest or general legislation—state 
actions may not contravene the constitution.  A constitutional right to a clean environment, or 
whatever form the provision may take, therefore provides an extra layer of protection for local 
action in support of that right.   
This kind of protection was responsible for the result in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
2013 decision in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth.237  At issue in that case was state legislation on 
natural gas drilling that included a clause explicitly preempting all local ordinances governing such 
drilling.  In considering challenges to the state law, the court engaged in a thorough discussion of 
Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment, which states that: 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, 
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural 
resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to 
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain 
them for the benefit of all the people.238 
 
The court recognized that localities had no inherent powers, and that the Commonwealth had the 
authority to alter or remove power granted to local governments.239  But it also acknowledged that 
“constitutional commands regarding municipalities’ obligations and duties to their citizens cannot be 
abrogated by statute.”240  The court found that the state scheme of voiding all local regulations 
                                                          
Policy and State Constitutions: the Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 Rutgers L.J. 863, 867 (1996) (“Virtually all state 
constitutions contain one or more provisions specifying environmental or natural resource policies; most include 
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235 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: the Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 Rutgers 
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236 See William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, 
and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 385, 446 (1997). 
237 83 A.3d 901 (2013). 
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240 Id. 
 47 
 
regarding fracking, and instead requiring local governments to take measures to accommodate 
fracking as needed, forced localities to act in contravention of the constitutional mandate.  It further 
stated that “[t]he [state] police power, broad as it may be, does not encompass [the] authority to . . . 
fundamentally disrupt . . . expectations respecting the environment.”241  Thus, the portion of the 
state legislation preempting local lawmaking was found to be improper.  
 In the same way, a constitutional provision protecting a right to a clean environment could 
support a locality’s power to develop initiatives—such as bans on bag bans—in support of that 
right.  And a ban on the ability of localities to combat pollution might be seen as a constitutional 
violation by the state.242  While these provisions would not impose any kind of affirmative obligation 
on the part of the state, they could potentially protect the right to local policymaking in support of 
trust resources.  Regardless of whether a state has a legislative or constitutional home rule system, or 
even a home rule system at all, state laws may not contravene the state constitution.  As seen in 
Robinson Township, and, to some degree in Romer and Windsor, state limits on local experimentation in 
support of a constitutional goal may be found to be unconstitutional.  If so, there would be no need 
to address the home rule framework.  Under such an analysis, state bans on bag bans would fail as a 
matter of constitutional law. 
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2. Public Trust Doctrine 
Of course, not all state constitutions incorporate explicit protections of environmental 
values.  Even where these textual protections do not exist, however,243 there may be a path forward 
for courts to uphold local environmental innovation in the face of contrary state authority.  The 
public trust doctrine is a much-discussed concept that may allow judges to push back on actions by 
the state that undermine environmental values.244  Both the precise scope and the legal foundation of 
the doctrine are still very much in flux, and heavily debated.245  In short, however, the concept of the 
public trust stands for the principle that certain environmental and natural resources are held in trust 
for citizens by the government.  The principal trustee of those resources is the state legislature,246 
although trust responsibilities may in some states be delegated to local governments.  Originally 
focused on aquatic resources, the more modern public trust doctrine has proven itself to be much 
more amphibious, and has been applied to a wider range of natural assets.   
Like the legal status of local government, the public trust doctrine is a creation largely of the 
judiciary.247  Its more modern use is often tied to Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, an 1892 case in 
which the Supreme Court confirmed “that the historic public trust doctrine was an independent 
limitation on the state’s power to sell or otherwise relinquish control over submerged lands that 
                                                          
243 As noted, state constitutional protections for the environment vary widely.  Where such protections exist, but are 
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244 Cf. Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
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instead must always be held ‘in trust’ for the public.”248  Following that case, and after the more 
recent revival of the doctrine by Professor Joseph Sax’s seminal 1970 law review article on the 
subject,249 “courts have decided hundreds of cases involving the public trust doctrine.”250  Its legal 
foundations remain unsettled, however, and the doctrine has long been subject to debate as to how 
far its limits extend, and how and when it should be applied.251  Indeed, the popularity of the 
doctrine among environmental advocates may be due in large part to its malleability.252  What many 
theories regarding the public trust have in common, however, is the recognition of a duty on the 
part of the state to “manage trust resources for the public benefit” and to “consider the public trust 
before taking action that may adversely affect trust resources.”253   
At the outset, it should be noted that in states with well-defined, enforceable public trust 
doctrines that expand beyond the traditional scope of navigable waters, an analysis could potentially 
proceed in much the same way as it would in the instance of constitutional protections.  That is, a 
party could potentially challenge a state law as violative of the public trust doctrine; under either a 
constitutional or legislative home rule framework, an invalid state law would not override local 
lawmaking abilities.  It seems more likely, however, given the lack of concrete public trust principles, 
that its more helpful and proper use in many states is as an aid in understanding competing state and 
local authority in the home rule system.  This conception of the public trust may leave open the 
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possibility for a judge to overturn reactive state legislation that eliminates local ability to advance 
environmental values.   
Scholars have advanced a range of proposals for how the public trust obligation might 
manifest itself.  These proposals run the gamut from calls for the public trust to impose an 
affirmative duty on the state, to those viewing the public trust as more of a background principle of 
property law.  Operating at the latter end of that spectrum, Professor William Araiza has suggested a 
means by which the public trust doctrine might move beyond its historic aquatic underpinnings 
while circumventing criticism that such an expansion lacks doctrinal foundation and inappropriately 
upsets the separation of powers between branches.254  Professor Araiza suggests that the public trust 
doctrine may be available to judges not as a doctrine with legally binding effects, but as a canon of 
construction, or a “background principle against which positive legislation and administrative actions 
are construed and reviewed.”255  Under this theory, courts could construe state legislative action that 
threatened values of the public trust “against the backdrop of a commitment to the protection of 
those values.”256   
As noted, courts in a number of cases have, where motivated by principles that support local 
control of an issue, created a sort of “shadow doctrine” upholding local authority in the face of state 
assertions of control. 257  It is difficult—and, as noted, contrary to much of environmental law and 
advocacy—to advance an argument that localities deserve deference in general for environmental 
policymaking.  The use of the public trust doctrine as an interpretive mechanism may, however, 
offer support of localities where state action would undermine or run contrary to advancement of 
the public trust.  Under such a theory, the public trust doctrine would not itself alter the home rule 
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analysis.  Instead, it could provide a basis for a judicial finding of protected local values in need of 
vindication. Targeted elimination of local authority unaccompanied by action at the state level 
creates obstacles to action on environmental issues and impedes actions in furtherance of the trust 
resources of the state.  Courts reviewing state action that invalidates local ability to act on 
environmental matters may find that public trust principles support a right to local innovation on 
such issues.  This kind of application of the public trust doctrine would not dictate a substantive 
outcome, or require affirmative action by the state.  But it would find that public trust principles 
operate as a check on state authority, and that a state cannot put up a wall against advancement of 
public trust values by localities. 
The suggested use of the public trust in this manner does not yet appear to have been 
applied; nevertheless, courts may be able to “act creatively” to vindicate public trust principles.258  
Taking Arizona’s treatment of bag bans again as a case study, this Article will make a first attempt at 
envisioning what this kind of approach would look like.  Arizona recognizes the public trust 
doctrine,259 and the scope of that doctrine is determined by the judiciary.260  Most formally, the 
public trust doctrine in Arizona “restricts the sovereign’s ability to dispose of resources held in 
public trust.”261  Arizona courts have expressly stated, however, that the public trust is not 
necessarily limited to a state’s traditional interest in land under water.262  It is possible, therefore, to 
consider how the public trust may come into play where the state legislature attempts to halt local 
environmental efforts. 
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As noted, where a state bans local ability to ban bag bans, or to impose fees on bags, the 
analysis of whether this elimination of local authority was in line with the state’s home rule 
delegation would typically look only to whether the ban was a general law, or was one impacting 
state concern.  Under either analysis, the ban would likely be upheld.  Where the public trust 
doctrine acts as a “thumb on the scale in favor of the public trust value,”263 however, the outcome 
could potentially be different.  By incorporating public trust values into the home rule framework, 
courts may have a legitimate role in balancing politics between city and state, and maintaining 
environmental protection as the constant.  In this way, the use of the doctrine is consistent with 
Joseph Sax’s original statement that “public trust law is not so much a substantive set of standards 
for dealing with the public domain as it is a technique by which courts may mend perceived 
imperfections in the legislative and administrative process.”264 
This approach may be vulnerable to the same kinds of critiques that have long been aimed at 
expansions of the public trust doctrine beyond its historic roots.  For instance, the public trust is 
often criticized as a countermajoritarian measure by courts overriding the will of the people, or as a 
judge-made doctrine lacking in legal foundation.  But where, as in the approach suggested here, 
judges are merely weighing whether one branch of government should have the ability to put an end 
to experimentation by another, concerns about override of the popular will may be less substantial.  
And while it is perhaps not a satisfying answer to critics of the legitimacy of the public trust’s 
foundations to say that the use of the public trust doctrine in this capacity is merely another example 
of judicial willingness to uphold local authority in certain instances, it is nonetheless true.  Upholding 
local experimentation in support of the environmental resources of citizens is in keeping with the 
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long tradition of the judiciary sorting out the extent of the power of the state; the ideas surrounding 
the public trust provide a reasoned basis on which that tradition may continue in environmental law. 
A. Constitutional Home Rule 
As discussed, Arizona’s home rule system is based on a constitutional grant of authority.  
The validity of any state law’s infringement on local authority under a constitutional home rule 
framework is likely to turn on whether the subject of the law in question is of “genuine state 
concern.” 265  If it is, the law is likely to be upheld.  Courts tend to give a liberal construction to what 
constitutes a “genuine state concern,” and often allow state laws to override local lawmaking.  Thus, 
for instance, Arizona courts could find that the question of how best to conduct pollution control, 
or creation of uniform business standards, is a matter of statewide concern.266  If that is the case, 
then a ban on bag bans would be an appropriate subject for state legislation and the state statute 
would be upheld.  While the extent to which state and local provisions conflict is often a subject of 
rich debate, in this example of the ban on bag bans, there is no question—local prohibition on bags 
directly conflicts with the state revocation of authority.  And in that circumstance, the state law 
prevails.267  Local bag bans would therefore be invalidated. 
The public trust doctrine could, however, potentially act as a “thumb on the scale” in favor 
of local authority that is generally absent from this analysis.268  The need for uniform business 
regulations, and mere state assertions of this interest, would likely be sufficient in a typical analysis to 
support a finding of the validity of the state statute.  Bringing in the public trust doctrine, however, 
both the state and local governments also have a genuine interest in the furtherance of values of the 
public trust.  Those values cannot be abrogated by or rejected in favor of competing interests.  A 
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judge assessing whether the state deserves deference in the question of how best to conduct 
pollution control may view that question differently where the state is under an obligation to uphold 
public trust values.  Viewing the public trust as a canon that counsels against the undermining of 
trust resources, a court could decide to give more weight to the outcome that would not do so.  A 
judge reviewing the state statute could potentially find that there is no genuine state interest in action 
that would undermine the trust, or that would prevent localities from policy experimentation that 
would advance their interest in preserving and maintaining trust resources.   
Without public trust principles, or a reason to uphold local action, such a finding is unlikely; 
with them, judges may find a legal basis on which to premise a decision in support of local authority.  
Such a construction would allow for emphasis on the local interest in maintaining the quality of local 
waterways and surrounding lands, and avoid state elimination of the ability to advance that 
preservation that was unaccompanied by state action on the issue.  In this way, the home rule 
doctrine itself could be infused with public trust, or environmental protection, principles.  Nothing 
in this analysis would create an affirmative obligation on the part of the state to take action to 
prevent pollution of the resources at issue here—in the bag ban context, state land and waterways.  
It may, however, prevent targeted removals by the state of a locality’s ability to uphold the 
environmental interests of its citizens.   
This proposal and analysis is admittedly general, and open to many kinds of ad hoc 
determinations.  That unbounded analysis is characteristic of both the home rule and public trust 
doctrines.  Judges have substantial leeway in defining cognizable state interests, and in allocating 
power between state and local governments.  The principles behind the public trust doctrine could 
similarly play a background role in justifying the judiciary’s action in halting state legislation that 
targets local authority.  That could make a critical distinction in the way that courts think about local 
authority, and may provide an avenue for expression of judicial skepticism about state action that 
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undermines environmental values or that is motivated by animus toward a set of progressive 
policies.  In this way, it could provide a way out from otherwise potentially inescapable deference to 
state authority in instances of explicit removal of local authority over environmental issues.  The 
approach set out here would likely not apply where the state itself has advanced a competing 
regulatory system for handling an environmental issue; it also would not support local authority on 
parochial policies that undermine public trust values.  The doctrine’s use here would instead be in 
highlighting the legal significance of state elimination of the opportunity for progress in support of 
environmental goals.  While the vagueness of this theory means that the analysis employed would 
necessarily vary by state, it also means that it is broad enough to encompass many sets of 
circumstances.269   
B. Legislative Home Rule 
The public trust as modifier of what constitutes a genuine state concern is unlikely to have 
an impact for cities operating under grants of legislative home rule.  For these cities, the operative 
question is instead whether or not the state law at issue constitutes general legislation.  If so, it may 
be upheld without employing any analysis of the state interest involved.  The public trust doctrine 
may have a role to play in the determination of general versus special legislation as well.   
Typically, as noted, a general law is simply defined as one that impacts all cities within a class equally.  
Infusing this analysis with public trust principles may create an opportunity for a different outcome 
in the case of environmental goals undermined by state action.   
In Cleveland v. State, an Ohio Court of Appeals considered a challenge by a city to the 
constitutionality of a state statute disallowing municipal bans on certain foods such as transfats.270  
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Ohio appears to have one of the most precise definitions in the country regarding what constitutes a 
general law, and employs a four-part test.  As part of the court’s assessment of the validity of the 
state statute, one of the factors it had to consider was whether the state ban had uniform application 
throughout the state.271  The statute in question applied on its face to all parts of the state, but 
addressed only food service operations and not retail food establishments.  The difference in 
coverage led the court to find that the law did not have uniform application.  While the court 
decided the question of uniformity on that basis, it also described an argument from amici 
participants that “any state law which prevents individual municipalities from acting to address food 
based health disparities resulting from local social, demographic, environmental and geographic 
attributes inevitably impacts different parts of the state in a non-uniform manner.”272  The parties 
did not address this issue, and it did not form the basis of the court’s decision, but the court 
nevertheless “f[ound] some merit in this argument.”273 
The public trust doctrine may be able to encourage a similar kind of analysis even in states 
that do not employ Ohio’s test for general legislation.  Under a typical analysis, a court’s 
determination of whether something constitutes a general law is limited to identifying the class to 
which the law applies, and assessing whether the application is uniform within the class.  As in 
Cleveland, the exemption of a large category of actors may prevent a finding of uniform application.  
But where, as in the case of Arizona’s ban on bag bans, the law applies to all cities and counties in 
the state, the law on its face is likely to be found uniform.  If the state and local governments are 
viewed through the lens of being holders of the public trust, however, the disparate impacts of state 
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prohibitions on local action may come into greater relief.  Removal of local authority to advance the 
environmental needs of their communities, without action on the state level to address those needs, 
means that some local governments will be able to uphold their public trust obligations while others 
will not.  Such a law therefore disadvantages cities who are attempting to protect trust resources 
through bag bans; it may also be viewed as conferring a special advantage in terms of advancing 
public trust values upon those localities who may be in less need of such a ban.274  While the public 
trust doctrine is unlikely to create affirmative obligations with regard to environmental protections, it 
may help to give the lie to purportedly uniform actions by the state that instead target actions by 
certain cities.  In this way, the public trust doctrine may empower courts to push back against 
reactive state legislation. 
V. Conclusion 
As noted, the home rule system took a variety of forms as it spread across the nation.  At its 
core, though, is recognition that piecemeal local governance undermines the ability of cities to 
respond to the needs of their citizens.  Targeted state removal of local authority to act to protect the 
environment undermines democratic ideals and prevents useful experimentation.275  It also has the 
potential to reduce participation in local government, as citizens feel that their choices are not 
valued.276  In this way, state revocation of local authority may “not only preven[t] cities from 
experimenting in democratic forms of organization,” but may “make experiments seem less 
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appealing.”277  There is important environmental work currently being done by cities, and a great 
need for that work to continue into the future.  The ability of states to remove the authority to act 
on issues at the city level while perpetuating inaction at the state level is therefore concerning.  
It is not the intent of this Article to send to the courts what is more properly the job of the 
legislature.  The public trust doctrine or other judge-made doctrines should not be a substitute for 
the hard work of governance and creating good rules at the legislative level.278  An approach more 
desirable than the one proposed here may be for state legislatures to amend home rule provisions to 
prevent reactionary revocation of local authority by the state legislature.279  By carving out a more 
certain piece of authority for localities, states could help prepare their communities for the coming 
decades in which cities are likely to confront a new set of environmental issues.  Until that occurs, 
however,280 upholding local ability to act will likely be the purview of the courts.  It is easy for 
environmental issues to be undervalued in the political process,281 and for movement on those issues 
to be undermined by the state legislature.  There is likely something of folly in suggesting that the 
same legislatures seen to be undermining environmental values make changes that would curtail their 
authority over local action, and there is a real potential for harm to environmental progress to be 
done if courts take no action in support of cities. 
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part of a settlement with the governor and oil and gas companies.  See, e.g., “Colorado Ballot Initiatives 88, 89 Pulled 
Today,” Oil & Gas 360 (Aug. 4, 2014),  http://www.oilandgas360.com/colorado-ballot-initiatives-88-89-pulled-today/ 
281 William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 693, 717 (2012). 
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There may of course be other ways for localities and private parties to achieve environmental 
progress within the constraints of home rule.  On the plastic bag front, retailers could choose not to 
stock plastic bags, or to offer incentives to customers for using reusable containers.  For instance, 
Whole Foods stores give customers a 10 cent credit for each reusable bag brought for grocery 
shopping.  More generally, it has been suggested that cities may also be able to incorporate existing 
state environmental protections instead of fashioning their own restrictions on use,282 or to employ 
Business Improvement Districts or other special districts that are outside the reach of traditional 
home rule laws.  These options do not, however, get at the heart of the question of when and how 
state lawmakers may strike down local environmental legislation.  State constitutional protections, 
and the public trust doctrine, could justify a clearer judicial doctrine on state removal of local 
authority on environmental issues. 
To be sure, local power over environmental issues is not an unalloyed good.283  Cities, or 
neighborhoods, may act in parochial ways that prevent progress on environmental topics.284  In the 
past, however, cities have experimented with governance in ways that have eventually created 
positive change at the state and national level.285  In this way, “[c]ities have served and might again 
serve as vehicles for the achievement of purposes that have been frustrated in modern American 
life,” and might provide the ability “to participate actively in the basic societal decisions that affect 
one’s life.”286  It is the hope of many that they can play the same role in responding to a number of 
pressing environmental needs.287  The home rule framework was designed to ensure that cities would 
have the ability to respond to their rapidly changing needs; by infusing home rule with an updated 
                                                          
282 See Kristen van de Biezenbos, Where Oil is King, Fordham Law Review (2016). 
283 See Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule (connecting local power to perpetuation of suburban sprawl); Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism (associating local control with parochial behaviors) 
284 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism; see also, e.g., Detroit suburb rejection of new Detroit transit plan (June 2016). 
285 Michéle Finck, The Role of Localism in Constitutional Change: A Case Study, 30 J.L. & Pol. 53, 54 (2014). 
286 Gerald E. Frug, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 20, Princeton University 
Press: Princeton (1999). 
287 Ian Douglas, CITIES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 309, I.B. Tauris (2013). 
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understanding of government obligations toward the environment, it may be brought a bit closer to 
achieving that goal. 
